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JURISDICTION
I.

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO TIMELY FILE,
As addressed in Defendants' earlier Motion for Summary Disposition to Dismiss

Plaintiffs Appeal as Untimely, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because
Plaintiff failed to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the final judgment. UTAH R.
APP. P. 3(a), 4(a) & 10(a). On June 8, 2007, the trial court entered its "Final Order" in
this matter in which all the pending items for review were fully resolved. (R. 44334436). Plaintiff was therefore required to file his appeal by July 9, 2007 or 30 days from
the June 8, 2007 Final Order. Plaintiff did not file his appeal until August 6, 2007-59
days after entry of the Final Order. (R. 4443-44). In a September 18, 2007 "Order," this
Court deferred ruling on this motion until plenary presentation of the merits, but indicated
that the parties could rest on the pleadings in reintroducing this issue in the appeal briefs.
Defendants respectfully refer the Court to their summary disposition motion which has
been fully briefed, including the determinative law, and request that Plaintiffs appeal be
dismissed as untimely.
II.

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANTS' APPEAL.
Defendants appeal the denial of their attorney's fees and costs of the trial court

(Honorable J.A. Dever of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah ("trial or lower court")). Defendants' appeal is properly before this Court pursuant
to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0), providing for Utah Supreme Court review of final

orders from any court of record from which the Utah Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction.
DEFENDANTS9 ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, PRESERVATION FOR
APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
(a)

Did the trial court err when it denied Defendants their attorney's fees where

they successfully defended against Plaintiffs claims?
This issue was preserved for appeal.
4389; 4433-36; 4450-53).

(R. 4012-4175; 4184-4348; 4352-4377;

This issue is a matter of law, which is reviewed for

correctness. Paul deGroot Bldg. Servs., L.L.C. v. Gallacher, 2005 UT 20, \ 18, 112P.3d
490; Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App. 404, \ 8, 38 P.3d 110.
(b)

Did the trial court err when it denied Defendants their request for costs?

This issue was preserved for appeal. (R. 4378-88; 4390-4432; 4456-58; 4459-71).
Normally, the standard of review for review of costs under Rule 54(d)(2) is an abuse of
discretion standard. Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, \ 4, 16 P.3d 549. However, where a
legal determination is made in applying this rule, as is the case here, the trial court's
decision is reviewed for correctness. Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, \ 76, 5 P.3d 616.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-27-56.5 Attorney's Fees-Reciprocal Rights to Recover

Attorney's Fees.
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party
that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note,
written contract, or other writing executed after April 28,
1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written
contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover
attorney's fees.
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UTAH

R. CIV. P. 54(d). Costs.
Except when express provision therefore is made either in a
statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as
of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs . . . .
STATEMENT OF CASE

Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
After being terminated for failure to perform (R. 2552, 3678 f 10), Stephen A.
Giusti ("Plaintiff), filed a Complaint on July 11, 2000, which was amended on August 9,
2000, alleging Fraud in the Inducement of Plaintiffs Employment and Employment
Contracts (Count I); Breach of Plaintiffs Employment Contracts (Count II); Breach of
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Count III); Breach of the Doctrine
of Promissory Estoppel (Count IV); Interference With Employment Relationship and
Defamation (Count V); and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count VI). (R.
58-98; a copy is in Plaintiffs Addendum ("PI. Add.") 16). Plaintiffs Complaint centered
on a common core of facts and related legal theories-Plaintiffs employment relationship
and employment termination. (Id.).
Defendants' Dismissal Motions
Defendants filed successive motions seeking dismissal of Plaintiff s claims, each
of which were granted. On January 2, 2001, the trial court dismissed defendant SunGard
Data Systems, Inc. for lack of personal jurisdiction. (R. 596-598, PI. Add. 2). On March
30, 2002, the trial court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the three contract claims
(Counts II-IV), which ruling was confirmed in an Order dated September 3, 2003. (R.

3

703-07, PL Add. 3; 2277-2279, PL Add. 7). On May 5, 2003, the trial court granted
Plaintiffs request to voluntarily dismiss his claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress (Count VI). (R. 2102-2103). In an Order dated September 19, 2005, the trial
court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs tortious
interference and defamation claims (Count V). (R. 3733-3738, PL Add. 8). In an Order
Granting Summary Judgment and Dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint with Prejudice dated
November 17, 2006, Plaintiffs only remaining claim (Count I), alleging fraudulent
inducement, was dismissed. (R. 3999-4002, PL Add. 10). In this order, the trial court
granted Defendants' costs and authorized them to submit an attorney's fees request. {Id.).
Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his Complaint. (R. 4443-4444, Add. 14).
Defendants' Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs
The trial court entered a "Final Order" on June 8, 2007, denying Defendants'
attorney's fees request on the grounds that Defendants failed to support their position that
fees were authorized where Defendants were only the prevailing, not "non-defaulting"
party. (R. 4433-4436, PI. Add. 11). Defendants' cross-appealed this decision on August
20,2007. (R. 4450-53).
Defendants submitted a Verified Memorandum of Costs on March 16, 2007,
seeking $11,289.96 in deposition costs and $2,039.60 in other general costs. (R. 43784382). The trial court granted $55.00 of Defendants' cost request. (R. 4456-58; PL Add.
15). Defendants appealed on September 7, 2007. (R. 4469-71).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The trial court properly dismissed SunGard Data Systems, Inc. for lack of

personal jurisdiction based on uncontroverted facts that show that SunGard and SWC,
Plaintiffs employer, have a typical parent-subsidiary relationship that does not justify
piercing the corporate veil to subject SunGard to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts.
II.

Plaintiffs arguments appealing the dismissal of his contract claims all

depend on the legal conclusion that Plaintiff had an employment agreement for a term of
twelve months. The trial court correctly ruled that as a matter of law, Plaintiff did not
have an employment agreement for a specified term. Plaintiff did not appeal or provide
any argument on this point and therefore waived his right to appellate review.
III.

The trial court properly held that to make out a claim for fraudulent

inducement, Plaintiff must establish damages and that the correct measure of damages on
an employment fraud claim is the income and benefits a plaintiff gives up when he or she
is fraudulently induced to accept new employment. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that
his purported fraudulent inducement to accept employment at SWC resulted in lower
compensation than had he remained at Cambric, his prior employer.
IV.

The trial court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs claim against individual

Defendants Hyde and Erickson that they tortiously interfered with Plaintiffs employment
relations with SWC by terminating Plaintiff based on their personal reasons and without
any legitimate business justification.

The uncontroverted facts show that Hyde and

Erickson were employees of SWC; hiring and firing of employees were clearly within the
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scope of their employment; and there was no evidence to establish that the termination of
Plaintiff was based solely on personal motivation.
V.

Defendants are entitled to their attorney's fees in successfully defending

against all of Plaintiff s claims. A Utah Supreme Court decision issued after the parties'
briefing in the lower court, Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 163 P.3d 728, moved the
law forward by rejecting a narrow reading of an attorney's fee provision that granted fees
to at least one of the parties in the litigation and holding that under those circumstances,
the other party is entitled to fees under Utah's reciprocity statute, Utah Code Ann.§ 7827-56.5. Attorney's fees are authorized in this case under Plaintiffs employment
agreement. For the same reason, Defendants are entitled to their costs. In the alternative,
Defendants are entitled to more than witness fees under Rule 54(d).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Sterling Wentworth Corporation ("SWC"), Plaintiffs employer, is a Utah

corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 61, PL Add.
16 f 10).
2.

Defendant SWC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of SunGard Investment

Ventures, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Wilmington, Delaware;
SunGard Investment Ventures, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant SunGard
Data Systems, Inc. ("SunGard"), a Delaware corporation headquartered in Wayne,
Pennsylvania. (R. 190-92, PI. Add. 20 ]f 6). SunGard is a holding company which does
not sell any products or services. (R. 190-92, PI. Add. 20 \ 8).
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3.

SunGard and SWC maintain separate and distinct corporate identities; each

maintains its own independent bylaws, minutes, books, corporate records, financial
records, bank accounts, and Board of Directors. (R. 440, PI. Add. 20 ^J 5).
4.

On November 7, 1999, plaintiff signed a letter from SWC President John C.

Hyde ("Hyde") dated October 29, 1999, accepting an offer of employment from SWC as
Vice President of Sales, (the "November 7 contract"). The letter covered the terms of
Plaintiffs compensation, including base salary, override, commissions, the amount of a
draw, stock options, vacation and benefits. With respect to the draw, the letter stated that
Plaintiffs compensation would consist of a "non-recoverable draw for a 12 month
period" at a rate of $7,500 per month, unless he elected to go to the "commission and
override plan." (R. 83-85, Pi's Add. 4).
5.

Upon his hire, Plaintiff entered into a written agreement entitled "Sterling

Wentworth Corporation Employment Agreement" ("SWC Employment Agreement")
dated December 5, 1999. The parties to the SWC Employment Agreement are Plaintiff
and SWC. The SWC Employment Agreement does not contain any terms addressing
Plaintiffs compensation package. (R. 423-427, Pi's Add. 6).
6.

On December 16, 1999, Plaintiff signed the same October 29, 1999 offer

letter from SWC President Hyde, with an initialed change indicating that he would
receive " 1 % override on corporate revenue." (R. 91-93, PI. Add. 5).
7.

The SWC Employment Agreement (i) superseded any prior representations

or agreements between the parties, (ii) contained an acknowledgment that Plaintiff was
not relying on any representations outside the Agreement, (iii) gave SWC the right to
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terminate Plaintiffs employment without cause, and (iv) provided for attorney's fees and
costs for the non-defaulting party. Specific pertinent provisions are:
6.2. Termination With or Without Cause: Employer may
terminate Employees' employment with Employer without cause at
any time upon two (2) weeks advance written notice to Employee.
7.3.
Miscellaneous: This Agreement constitutes the entire
understanding and agreement between the Parties and supersedes all
prior agreements, representations and understanding of the Parties.
This Agreement may not be amended or modified except by an
instrument in writing signed by each of the Parties. Each party
acknowledges and agrees that he is not relying upon any
representations, warranties, or other statements concerning the
subject matter of this Agreement . . . . In the event either party
defaults in any of the terms or provisions of this Agreement the nondefaulting party shall be entitled to recover its, his or her reasonable
attorney's fees and costs incurred[,] whether or not suit is
commenced or final judgment obtained.
(R. 426, PI. Add. 6).
8.

Prior to joining SWC in December of 1999, Plaintiff was employed by

Cambric Corporation ("Cambric") from June 11, 1999 to November 20, 1999. (R. 2751,
3674 1f 1). Plaintiffs salary at Cambric was $125,000 per year. (R. 3751, 3674 ^ 2).
Plaintiff received one bonus in the amount of $25,000 while employed by Cambric plus
an $800 per month car allowance. (R. 2751, 3674 1ffl 2-3).
9.

On or about November 20, 1999, Plaintiff voluntarily resigned his

employment with Cambric in order to accept employment with SWC. (R. 2751, 3675 |
6). Plaintiffs salary at SWC was $180,000 for the first year, consisting of $90,000
annual salary plus a non-recoverable draw of $7,500 per month. (R. 2752, 3677 f 9).
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10.

At the time of Plaintiffs termination, Hyde was SWC's Group CEO and

Paul Erickson ("Erickson") was SWC's President; together they were responsible for the
operation of SWC. (R. 2752, 3679ffi[14-15).
11.

On May 12, 2000, SWC terminated Plaintiffs employment based on

performance. (R. 2552, 3678 ^f 10). Hyde's dissatisfaction with Plaintiff was based on a
variety of performance-based issues including that: 1) Plaintiff was not active enough in
driving revenue and closing deals for the company; 2) Plaintiff was not sufficiently
familiar with SWC's products; 3) some of the salespeople had complained about
Plaintiff; and 4) Plaintiff was not effective in promoting SWC's products, motivating and
training the sales organization, dealing with customers, helping to close deals, and
interacting with team members.

(R. 2753, 3680 ^f 18). In contemporaneous email

communications with Erickson, Hyde raised a host of concerns he had regarding
Plaintiffs performance:
[T]he four issues that I want to speak to with Steve are the
following: 1) Hitting our revenue targets. This does not
mean actively reporting on forecasts and pipelines. It means
driving revenue and getting the job done. I look to the vp of
sales as the one who ultimately puts the rock on his back and
carries it. He has to be actively DRIVING revenue and
taking ownership of the goals and making it happen. He
needs to know how to get in and close deals not just manage
and train reps. There is a big difference between the two. 2)
Credibility and confidence with his sales people. Bottom line
they are not responding well to his management style and
process. They do not view him as someone who is helping
them but rather is demanding a lot with not much in return.
This is probably my biggest concern. 3) He is not creating a
working relationship with the two people outside his
organization that he needs the most. Phil Harker and Chad
Gardner. He has alienated both. They have not readily
9

accepted him either but he has not found a way to work with
them and they need to be his biggest supporters. 4) He is
viewed by many in SWC as a bully and they do not like
working with him. This is again a style issue but is not
serving him well.
(R. 2753-54, 3684 f 20). On May 4, 2000, Hyde wrote to Erickson and reiterated his
concerns regarding Plaintiff:
For me all the warning signs are there right in front of us. 1)
He has no credibility with his own representative. 2) He
hasn't taken on a single deal and closed it in his 5 months
with the company. 3) He has spent less than 20 days on the
road in his first 5 months. 4) He still says he is coming up to
speed on our products and knows less about them than the
representatives. 5) He has alienated those that he needs the
most (Chad, Troy, Phil). 6) People don't like working with
him (Ami won't even talk to him unless she absolutely has
to). 7) He has not taken ownership of the revenue numbers.
8) He is not a leader he is a manager.
(R. 2754, 3686^21).
12.

Erickson testified that his dissatisfaction with Plaintiff was based on

concerns different from Hyde's, and culminated in Plaintiffs refusal to commit to any set
of revenue targets by which he would be willing to be measured. More specifically,
Erickson explained that, despite Hyde's dissatisfaction with Plaintiff, Erickson was
prepared to retain Plaintiff if he would: 1) commit to specific revenue targets to be set by
Plaintiff; and 2) devise a plan to accomplish the revenue goals. (R. 2755, 3686 ^ 22). By
May 2000, Erickson was looking for a statement of confidence, direction and energy
from Plaintiff. (R. 2755, 3686 U 22). Plaintiffs failure to agree to a concrete set of
revenue goals or articulate a plan, coupled with his admission that he simply did not
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know what to do to meet such goals, ultimately caused Erickson to terminate Plaintiff
(after Plaintiff turned down two alternative SWC positions). (R. 2755, 3687 % 23).
13.

On June 22, 2000, Plaintiff

Technologies, Inc. ("Callware").

obtained

employment with

Callware

(R. 2752, 3678 ^f 11). He remained employed by

Callware during the litigation. (Id.). Plaintiffs base salary at Callware when hired was
$125,000 per year.

(R. 2752, 3678 1f 12).

In addition to base salary, Plaintiff has

received sales commissions from Callware. (R. 2752, 3678 f 13).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED SUNGARD FOR LACK OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The law that the lower court applied in dismissing SunGard for lack of personal

jurisdiction in Utah is not in dispute: "Companies conducting business through their
subsidiaries can qualify as transacting business in a state provided the parent
sufficient control over the subsidiary...."

exercises

Litster v. Aha Corp., 2006 WL 3327906 (D.

Utah Nov. 14, 2006). (emphasis added). 1 See also, Fisher Baking Co. v. Continental
Banking Corp., 238 F. Supp. 322, 326 (D. Utah 1965) (court declined to exercise
personal jurisdiction over parent company where parent's control over wholly-owned
subsidiary of nature that might be expected between parent and subsidiary).
Courts have long recognized that a typical parent/subsidiary relationship involves
some amount of control, direction and supervision by the parent, and that this does not
destroy the separate corporate identities between the parent and subsidiary such that

All unpublished decisions are provided in the addendum.
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personal jurisdiction is conferred over the parent.

See, e.g., IDS Life Ins. Co. v.

SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that parents of
wholly owned subsidiaries necessarily control, direct, and supervise subsidiaries to some
extent but unless there is basis to pierce the corporate veil, parent is not liable for the torts
of its subsidiary and there is no personal jurisdiction over parent).2
In Fisher Baking Co., the parent's "control" over the subsidiary consisted of
receiving reports on the subsidiary's operations; receiving summaries of the minutes of
the meetings of the subsidiary's stockholders and board of directors; approving certain
leases of the subsidiary; approving some major purchases of the subsidiary, including
property and business acquisitions; setting the salary of the subsidiary's Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer and approving salary increases for certain other key
officers; and including certain subsidiary officers in stock option, bonus and retirement
annuity plans.

Id. at 325.

Additionally, substantial inter-corporate telephonic

communication occurred between the management personnel of the parent and
subsidiary, and the parent was kept closely informed of the operations of the subsidiary

See also, Sammons Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court, 205 Cal. App.3d 1427 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988) (nonresident parent corporation not subject to personal jurisdiction based
solely on independent activities of wholly owned subsidiary even where parent exercises
general executive responsibility for operations of subsidiary and reviews its major policy
decisions); Savin Corp. v. Heritage Copy Prod., Inc., 661 F. Supp. 463, 469-470 (M.D.
Pa. 1987) (where four of twelve directors of subsidiary were current or former officers of
parent, a director of parent made weekly visits to oversee the operations of subsidiary,
and the parent had input regarding the salaries of the subsidiary's top-level executives,
court held that type of control parent exhibited was "no more than what would be
expected of a majority shareholder").
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through financial statements, other reports, audits and general supervision by officers of
the parent as to financial records and reporting. Id. at 325-26.
The Fisher Baking court found that this level of activity was natural and
permissible between a parent and subsidiary. Id. at 327.

Given that the two companies

had their own articles of incorporation, by-laws, directors, officers, books of account,
bank accounts and operating employees, and the formal separateness of the parent and
subsidiary had not been substantially disregarded, the court held that the parent was not
subjected to personal jurisdiction in Utah. Id. at 325.4
In this case, the undisputed facts, many of which are contained in an affidavit of
Andrew P. Bronstein, the Vice President/Controller of SunGard Data Systems, Inc.,
demonstrate that SunGard and SWC had a normal parent/subsidiary relationship. SWC
is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 61,
PI. Add. 16 TJ10). SWC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of SunGard Investment Ventures,
Inc., a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Wilmington, Delaware; SunGard

The court explained: "[A] parent company doesn't have to be insulated from any
influence, information or reports concerning the operations of its subsidiary. The two
corporations do not have to live in two entirely [sic] business worlds as the price of their
recognition as separate entities." Id. at 326; accord Benton v. Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d
1070, 1081 (10th Cir. 2004) (existence of officers and directors in common does not
constitute parental control of a subsidiary).
See also LaSalle National Bank v. Vitro, Sociedad Anonima, 85 F. Supp. 2d 857, 865-66
(N.D. 111. 2000) (it is normal for parent to have comprehensive business plan for its
subsidiary and to control, direct and supervise subsidiary to some extent); International
Customs Assoc, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 893 F. Supp. 1251, 1255-56 (S.D. N.Y. 1995)
(where parent was not signatory on contract between plaintiff and subsidiary, no claim
stated against parent for alleged breach of subsidiary's contract).
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Investment Ventures, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of SunGard, a Delaware
corporation headquartered in Wayne, Pennsylvania.

(R. 190-92, PL Add. 20 ^|6).

SunGard is a holding company which does not sell any products or services. (Id. ^8). It
does not manage or direct SWC operations; SWC is run as a separate and distinct
corporate entity. (Id. %5). SunGard and SWC maintain separate and distinct corporate
identities; and each maintains its own independent bylaws, minutes, books, corporate
records, financial records, bank accounts, and Board of Directors. (Id.). On November
7, 1999, Plaintiff signed a letter from SWC President Hyde dated October 29, 1999,
accepting an offer of employment from SWC as Vice President of Sales. (R. 83-85, Pi's
Add.4). Upon his hire, Plaintiff entered into the SWC Employment Agreement dated
December 5, 1999. The parties to the SWC Employment Agreement are Plaintiff and
SWC. (R. 423-427, Pi's Add. 6).
In dismissing SunGard for lack of personal jurisdiction, the lower court,
recognizing the governing legal principles, held:
Accepting the factual allegations contained in Plaintiffs First
Amended Complaint as true, those allegations are legally
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over SunGard.
As a matter of law, SunGard and Sterling Wentworth
Corporation have a typical parent-subsidiary relationship that
does not justify piercing the corporate veil to subject SunGard
to the jurisdiction of this Court.
(R. 597).
Plaintiff argues on appeal that the lower court considered matters outside the
pleadings. (Plaintiffs Brief "PL Br." 29). This complaint is puzzling. He himself
recognizes in his brief that a trial court is permitted to consider evidence outside the
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pleadings when deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over a
defendant. See OMI Holdings v. Royal Ins. Co. of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir.
1998) (explaining that plaintiff can make its showing by using an "affidavit or other
written materials"); (PL Br. 29).
On appeal Plaintiff also argues that he was required to make more than a prima
facie showing of jurisdiction over SunGard. (PL Br. 29). Plaintiff apparently bases his
argument on the volume, as opposed to the content, of the allegations he made regarding
SunGard's activities in Utah. However, Plaintiff was required to submit well pleaded
facts as opposed to speculative or conclusory allegations in opposing SunGard's motion.
Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Internet, 205 F.3d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining
that only well pleaded facts of plaintiffs complaint, as distinguished from mere
conclusory allegations, will be accepted as true).

Plaintiffs allegations regarding

SunGard's activities in the State are all conclusory; he relies on his allegations against
SWC as the basis for an alleged activity of SunGard in Utah based on the legal
conclusion that SWC and SunGard are one and the same. For example, an allegation that
SWC, Plaintiffs employer, provided employment benefits to Plaintiff, is the basis for
Plaintiffs allegation that SunGard engaged in business activity in Utah by providing
employment benefits to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff also argues that the lower court disregarded disputes of facts, weighed the
evidence against him and should have allowed Plaintiff to conduct discovery. (PL Br.
29). But Plaintiff fails to put forward any specific dispute of material fact, to show how
or what evidence was weighed against him, or to "identify what discovery he seeks or
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why it would be fruitful to the precise issues before the Court"; consequently, this Court
should decline to consider this argument. NcNeill v. Geostar, 2007 WL 1577671, at *3
(D. Utah May 29, 2007); see also, Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109-10 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995) (declining to address appellant's argument where he set forth little legal
analysis on the issue presented, did not specifically discuss how the trial court erred and
did not marshal the evidence).
In his appellate argument that general personal jurisdiction over SunGard is
present, Plaintiff recites the language of Utah's Long Arm Statute-not well-pleaded
facts-stating that SunGard "engaged in substantial and continuous business activities in
Utah" by "transacting business in Utah"; "contracting to supply services or goods in
Utah"; "causing tortious injury and damage . . . in Utah; and by "owning, using or
possessing property in Utah." (PI. Br. 32). Plaintiff fails to provide even one example of
a fact indicating that SunGard's control over SWC was greater than normally associated
with a parent/subsidiary relationship much less a factual dispute that should be
considered by this Court.
Likewise, in his argument that he established specific personal jurisdiction over
SunGard, he states broad, conclusory allegations, never puts forward any example of
conflicting evidence allegedly decided in SunGard's favor, and again, makes unfounded
substitutions of SunGard in the allegations against SWC. For example, he states that
SunGard engaged in the activity of "recruiting of employees in Utah, including Plaintiff
Giusti, by Hyde and Erickson" based on SWC's recruiting of Plaintiff in Utah; and that
SunGard engaged in the activity of "causing tortious injury resulting in economic,
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reputation and emotional damages" to Plaintiff based on his claim that SWC's
termination of his employment caused such an injury. (PL Br. 33).
In sum, the lower court did not disregard any dispute of fact, did not weigh the
evidence, require more than a prima facie showing of jurisdiction by Plaintiff, or
improperly deny Plaintiff the opportunity to conduct discovery before ruling on the
jurisdiction question. Accordingly, the decision to dismiss SunGard for lack of personal
jurisdiction should be affirmed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT CLAIMS,
A, As a Matter of Law, the November 7 contract did not Create a TwelveMonth Term of Employment.
Plaintiff raises three arguments in support of his appeal of the trial court's decision

to dismiss his contract claims.5 He argues that Section 7.3 of the SWC Employment
Agreement allows him to rely on his November 7 contract for employment for a term of
twelve months; he did not agree to modify the November 7 contract granting him
employment for a term of twelve months; and he was fraudulently induced by Human
Resources Director Pat Black to sign the SWC Employment Agreement of December 5,
1999 that contained an at-will provision. (PI. Br. 34-40). All three arguments are based
on the incorrect underlying legal conclusion that Plaintiff had a November 7, 1999
"contract" that provided him with "a minimum term" of twelve months employment at
Plaintiffs contract claims are: Breach of Contract (Count II); Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Count III); and Breach of the Doctrine of
Promissory Estoppel (Count IV). (R. 58-98).
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SWC and thus his employment termination after five months was unlawful. (PI. Br. 35,
36, 38, Pi's Add. 4).
The facts relating to the November 7 contract are these. On November 7, 1999,
Plaintiff signed a letter dated October 29, 1999, accepting an offer of employment from
SWC as Vice President of Sales. (R. 83-85). The November 7 contract covered the
terms of Plaintiffs compensation, including base salary, override, commissions, the
amount of a draw, stock options, vacation and benefits. (R. 83-85). With respect to the
draw, the letter stated that Plaintiffs compensation would consist of a "non-recoverable
draw for a twelve month period" at a rate of $7,500 per month, unless within the "twelvemonth period" he elected to go to the "commission and override plan." (R. 83-85, PI.
Add. 4).
On December 5, 1999 Plaintiff and SWC entered into the SWC Employment
Agreement.

(R. 423-27, PI. Add. 6). The SWC Employment Agreement does not

contain any terms addressing Plaintiffs compensation package but does contain a section
indicating that SWC may terminate Plaintiffs employment without cause at any time
upon two weeks' advance written notice:
6.2 Termination With or Without Cause. Employer may
terminate Employee's employment with Employer without
cause at any time upon two (2) weeks advance written notice to
Employee. Employee may terminate Employee's employment
with Employer with or without cause at any time upon two (2)
weeks advance written notice to Employer.
(R. 426, PL Add.6).
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On December 16, 1999, Plaintiff signed the same October 29, 1999 offer letter
from SWC President Hyde that he had signed on November 7, with an initialed change
indicating that he would receive " 1 % override on corporate revenue." (R. 91-93, 58-98,
PL Add. 5).
Plaintiffs reliance on the legal conclusion that the November 7 contract
established that SWC agreed to employ Plaintiff for a term of twelve months is contrary
to the lower court's ruling:
The question addressed by the parties in their supplemental
briefing on the matter was whether the final offer letter,
signed after the employment agreement, modified the
employment agreement by adding a definite term of
employment for at least the first year. The letters do not
conflict with, nor refer to the employment agreement, each
providing different portions of the agreement between the
parties. The language of the offer letters clearly discuss the
provision of certain benefits associated with Plaintiffs
employment with Sterling Wentworth. Even standing alone,
these terms, especially the providing for a monthly subsidy,
while assuming the employment relationship between the
parties will last for at least a year express only the timing of
the benefits and compensation while Plaintiff is in
Defendants' employ. When read with the explicit provision
in the employment agreement stating employment may be
terminated with or without cause, any doubt to the contrary
is conclusively resolved.
(R. 703-07, PL Add. 3) (emphasis added).6

Plaintiff had argued below that both signed October 29, 1999 offer letters established
that he had a contract for a specified term of twelve months (R. 343) thus the lower
court's order first refers to the "final offer letter," meaning the October 29, 1999 offer
letter signed on December 12, 1999. The court's order then refers to "letters," meaning
both signed October 29, 1999 offer letters - the one signed on November 7 and the one
with a slight revision signed on December 12, 1999. (R. 704).
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Plaintiff does not directly appeal or provide any argument on appeal in opposition
to the lower court ruling that the offer letter he signed on November 7, 1999 does not
establish employment for a specified term. {See, e.g., PL Br. 2 % 2-noticeably absent is
any discussion on this issue). Therefore the trial court's decision stands and Plaintiffs
appeal of the dismissal of his contract claims fails. Phillips, 904 P. 2d at 1109-10.
Even if Plaintiff had appealed the lower court's ruling on his November 7 contract,
the lower court made the correct decision: As a matter of law, SWC's informing plaintiff
about how his compensation would be paid over a twelve-month period of time does not
convert his hiring into employment for a specific term.
Under Utah law, a promise by an employer to continue employment for a specified
period must be clear and definite:
There must be a manifestation of the employer's intent that is
communicated to the employee and sufficiently definite to
operate as a contract provision.
Furthermore the
manifestation of the employer's intent must be of such a
nature that the employee can reasonably believe that the
employer is making an offer of employment other than
employment at will.
Johnson v. Morton Thiokollnc, 818 P.2d 997, 1002 (Utah 1991).
The Utah Court of Appeals has applied this standard to a case in which a plaintiff
claimed that statements by his employer involving future time periods in his employment
created a contract for a specified time. Evans v. GTE Health Sys. Inc., 857 P.2d 974
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). In Evans, GTE told Evans, in the process of offering Evans a
position as a sales representative in 1989, that:
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[I]n his first year of employment he would be expected to sell
his home and relocate to Miami, attend an IBM sales agent
training program, become familiar with GTE products and
begin making contacts . . . . [Evans was also told that] he was
not expected to close significant sales until the end of 1990 or
early 1991 and that he would not be terminated unless he was
unable to close sales by the first or second quarter of 1991.
857 P.2d at 975. Less than two and one-half months after Evans had begun work, his
employment was terminated. Evans claimed that GTE's assurances that he would not
have to close sales until the end of 1990 or the beginning of 1991 created a contract for a
specified time period. Affirming summary dismissal of Evans' claim, the appellate court
specifically rejected that argument:
As for the assurances that Evans would not have to close sales
until the end of 1990 or the beginning of 1991, these sorts of
comments fall more into the category of general job
descriptions than binding manifestations of the employer's
intent to enter into a contract for a specified time period. GTE
was basically explaining the length of the sales cycle to Evans
so that he would know that GTE did not expect him to
immediately begin to close sales and that GTE would not be
concerned about his sales record until late 1990 or early 1991.
If this court were to perceive an implied contract to employ
Evans for a definite time period based upon these
representations, then an employer could never tell a
potential employee in a job interview what was expected of
him or her over the next few months or years without
creating such a contract
Id. at 977-78 (emphasis added). Thus, the Evans court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to
recharacterize a reference to a specified time period made during a discussion about the
parties' expectations as a contract of employment for a specific duration.
This fundamental principle-that telling a potential employee what to expect over a
specified time does not create a contract of employment for a term-underlies the well-
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established rule that an employee is not hired for a definite term by specifying his
compensation over a particular time period. For example, in Garcia v. Aetna Fin. Co.,
752 F.2d 488 (10th Cir. 1984), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a plaintiffs
claim for breach of an employment contract for a specified term based on the employer's
statement quoting the salary for a year:
As to plaintiffs contention that defendant's rehiring on a
salary based on a yearly amount implied a fixed term of
employment, "unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, a
contract which sets forth an annual salary rate but states no
definite term of employment is considered to be indefinite
employment, terminable at the will of either party without
incurring liability for breach of contract."
752 F.2d at 491 (citing Justice v. Stanley Aviation Corp., 530 P.2d 984, 986 (Co. 1974)).7

7

Accord Tarr v. Credit Suisse Asset Mgmt, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 785, 804-05 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (where executive hired in 1991 entered into memorandum of understanding
containing annual salary, yearly salary increases and bonuses through 1993, no
employment contract through 1993 was created); Simmons v. John F. Kennedy Medical
Center, 727 F. Supp. 440, 443 (N.D. 111. 1991) (motion to dismiss granted where plaintiff
offered annual salary and tuition reimbursement for two-year MBA program; no contract
for fixed duration arose); Lubore v. RPM Assoc, Inc., 61A A.2d 547, 553-54 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1995,) (where individual was hired as marketing and sales executive, offer
letter stating annual base salary and "Projected Year 1" and "Projected Year 2" total
salary did not create contract for two-year duration, but simply was concerned with
manner in which compensation was projected); Singh v. Cities Service Oil Co., 554 P.2d
1367, 1369 (Okla. 1976) (court rejected claim of employment for definite term where
compensation was quoted for one-year term, adopting "American doctrine": contract
"which merely specifies a salary proportionate to units of time which are utilized for the
purposes of accounting or payment" does not indicate that employment is to continue for
stated unit of time); Loeffler v. Kjellgren, 884 S.W.2d 463, 468 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)
(where letters "simply set forth what plaintiff could expect to earn by way of
compensation if he continued to work for Fleetline [for four years] ... no guarantee of
employment for a definite term"); Thompson v. Telco, Inc., 1999 WL 548610 (Tenn. Ct.
App. July 29, 1999) (letter agreement was employment contract, but letter's guarantee of
compensation over five years was held to convey only level at which plaintiff would be
compensated, not length of time he would be employed).
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Because the November 7 contract does not establish an agreement as to duration
of employment, Plaintiffs was an indefinite hiring, terminable at the will of either party,
consistent with Plaintiffs SWC Employment Agreement which contains express
language stating unambiguously that SWC may terminate Plaintiffs employment without
cause at any time.
Because the November 7 contract did not provide Plaintiff with employment for a
twelve-month term, Plaintiffs first argument that his written employment agreement with
SWC of December 5, 1999 (PI. Add. 6) specifically allows him to rely on the prior
November 7 contract, fails as a matter of law.

(PL Br. 34-35). The Employment

Agreement contains a clear and unambiguous statement that Plaintiffs "employment may
be terminated without cause at any time upon two (2) weeks advance written notice."
Plaintiff points to an exception for "related documents" in the integration clause
contained in the SWC Employment Agreement in arguing that his November 7 contract
governs, and he was not at-will:
7.3 Miscellaneous. This Agreement constitutes the entire
understanding and agreement between the Parties and
supersedes all prior agreements, representations and
understanding of the Parties.... Each party acknowledges and
agrees that he is not relying upon any representations,
warranties or other statements concerning the subject matter
of this Agreement except as may be expressly set forth in this
agreement or related documents.
This argument fails for two reasons. First, because Plaintiff never made this
argument below, he waived the right to appeal this issue. 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat,
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Inc., 2004 UT 72, % 51, 99 P.3d 801 (Utah 2004) (to preserve an issue for appeal, among
other things, "the issue must be specifically raised" in the trial court); Coleman v.
Stevens, 2000 UT 98 K 9, 17 P.3d 1122 (three issues plaintiff failed to raise before the
trial court would not be considered on appeal and it was not plain error or manifest justice
to preclude plaintiff from arguing the issues in the reply on appeal).

Second, this

argument fails for the additional and overriding reason that, as discussed above, the
underlying assumption that the November 7 contract guaranteed Plaintiff employment for
a term of twelve months is not legally correct and is not subject to review on this appeal.
Plaintiff next argues on appeal that the dismissal of his contract claims was
incorrect because he did not agree to modify the November 7 contract to hire him for a
minimum of twelve months. (PL Br. 36-37). Once again, the November 7 contract was
not an agreement to employ Plaintiff for a term of twelve months.
Lastly, Plaintiff argues on appeal that the dismissal of his contract claims was
incorrect because the SWC Employment Agreement, including its at-will provision, was
fraudulently induced by Pat Black, the SWC Human Resources Director, who allegedly
told Plaintiff he was "was required to sign the Agreement in order to obtain his
employment benefits [when] no such requirement existed." (PI. Br. 15 \ 17, 38). Like
his first arguments Plaintiff never made the argument in the trial court that Pat Black
fraudulently induced the SWC Employment Agreement and cannot now raise it on
appeal. 438 Main Street, 2004 UT 72, ^ 51. Even if it were an issue for this Court's
review, as discussed above, as a matter of law, the November 7 contract was not an
agreement to employ Plaintiff for a term of twelve months. Consequently, without an
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agreement as to duration of employment, Plaintiffs was an indefinite hiring, terminable
at the will of either party regardless of the SWC Employment Agreement. In other
words, even if he had not signed the SWC Employment agreement, he would still be an
at-will employee.
In sum, the lower court correctly concluded that SWC's decision to terminate
Plaintiffs employment is not a breach of contract or a breach of a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing and Plaintiff has no claim for promissory estoppel.
B. Plaintiffs Contract Claims Not Related to His Termination Were
Properly Dismissed.
Plaintiffs final point in appealing the dismissal of his contract claims is an attempt
to revive breach of contract allegations that supposedly do not relate to his termination
from employment. He argues that the trial court failed to "recognize" that he asserted
contractual claims unrelated to his employment termination. (PL's Br. 39). In a footnote
in his appellate brief, Plaintiff lists the alleged "other" contract claims, summarized as
follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Failure to pay Plaintiff commissions or bonuses beyond the date of his
employment termination;
Failure to give him information to properly train his sales team;
Undermining his authority by communicating with employees who reported
to him;
Threatening to terminate his employment "for cause;"
Refusal to discuss his unsatisfactory performance;
Leading Plaintiff to believe that the sales team didn't need to meet its
revenue goal for 2000.

(PL's Br.39 n. 5).
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In August 2000, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs contract claims-Counts
II, III and IV of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint-pointing out that Plaintiffs
contract claims not related to termination were actually complaints that he did not receive
things that were cut off by his termination. (R. 154-58). Plaintiff did not address the
issue in his response to Defendant's motion. (R. 340-97). The court dismissed Counts II,
III and IV of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint in an Order entered March 30, 2002.
(R. 703-704; PI. Add 3).
In August of 2003, Plaintiff requested that the lower court clarify the status of his
contract claims and argued that those not related to his termination remained at issue in
the case. (R. 2158-63). Defendants opposed Plaintiffs position on those claims. (R.
2230-36). In his reply memorandum (R. 2255), Plaintiff listed his contract claims not
related to his termination.

Only two of the so-called contract claims not related to

termination that Plaintiff cites in his appellate brief were listed in the pleading below in
which Plaintiff tried to revive the allegations: number 1-compensation he would have
received had he not been terminated; and number 6-statements that led Plaintiff to
believe he would not be held to revenue production goals in 2000.
The lower court, in an order entered September 4, 2003, confirmed that its intent
in the March 30, 2002 order was to dismiss the three counts of Plaintiff s First Amended
Complaint "which collectively comprise all of plaintiffs claims sounding in contract."
(R. 2277-78). The lower court's decision that those two issues were dismissed was
proper; they both were things that Plaintiff claimed he would have received had they not
been cut off by his termination, which the trial court expressly held was lawful.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ON COUNT I, PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR
FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT
In addition to Plaintiffs several claims alleging that Defendants breached the

contract by, among other things, wrongful termination, Plaintiff separately alleged in
Count I that he had been fraudulently induced to leave his prior employment and join
SWC. (R. 74). More specifically, Plaintiff claimed that in reliance on various alleged
misrepresentations by Hyde and Erickson, he
left his secure executive position at Cambric Corporation
including the substantial salary, bonuses, benefits and
opportunities for promotion he enjoyed in that employment,
relinquished the possibility of employment in high paying
executive positions in other companies and agreed to be
employed by the defendants as the Vice President of Sales for
SWC.. . .
(R. 65 122).
In its early motion to dismiss Plaintiffs fraud claim, Defendants argued that the
terms of Plaintiffs at-will employment agreement foreclosed any action based on
reliance upon terms other than those expressed in the agreement. (R. 148-50). While
granting Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs contract claims, the trial court denied
Defendants' motion regarding the fraudulent inducement claim based on the following
rationale:
While Plaintiff has argued his claims for fraudulent
inducement refer to Defendants' inducing Plaintiff to enter
into employment with the Defendant (which would be fatal in
light of language in the employment agreement by which
Plaintiff affirmatively acknowledges reliance upon only those
terms expressed therein), the Court believes he misapplies the
theory under the facts alleged in the complaint. The injury
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for which Plaintiff seeks recovery does not rise from
Plaintiffs entry into this employment agreement, but rather
from his being induced to relinquish his previous
employment based upon the fraudulent misrepresentations
of the Defendants. The claim of fraudulent inducement is
typically employed to avoid contractual obligations, either by
a plaintiff, seeking rescission of the contract, or by a
defendant, seeking to avoid his obligations thereunder. While
Plaintiff expresses his first cause of action as fraudulent
inducement, the Court reads that as a claim for recovery upon
a more general fraud theory.
(R. 705) (emphasis added).
The trial court's reasoning correctly distinguished between Plaintiffs contract
claims-which clearly sought damages related to earnings and benefits of which Plaintiff
contended he had been deprived as a result of his wrongful termination-and Plaintiffs
claim for fraudulent inducement, in which Plaintiff alleged he had been damaged by his
abandonment of earnings and benefits from his prior employment.

The trial court

properly recognized that any damages Plaintiff sustained as a result of his alleged
fraudulent inducement would be measured by comparing the compensation he forewent
at his previous employment with his compensation following the alleged inducement. (R.
705). This approach is entirely consistent with this Court's ruling in Ong International
(U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993) (in order to be
recoverable, fraud damages must be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
defendant's acts).

Additionally, Utah courts have drawn a sharp distinction in the

employment setting between contract and fraud damages.

In Walker v. Micron

Technology, Inc., 1998 WL 1769732, at *4-7 (Utah Dist. Ct. May 13, 1998), the
plaintiffs, like Plaintiff, were employed at-will and, therefore, could not state a claim for

28

breach of an employment contract. Plaintiffs' fraud allegations, stated the court, were
"simply trying to take another bite at the apple." Id. at *7. The court held that a
"contract claim may not be pled as a fraud action in order to circumvent the
unavailability of a contract remedy for a job termination." Id. at *8. Likewise, here,
Plaintiff may not seek breach of contract damages based on allegations of fraud.
To the extent that the Utah courts have not definitively confirmed that the proper
measure of damages for fraudulent inducement in the employment context are those sums
that would have been earned or recovered had the plaintiff not been improperly lured to
resign his prior position, the trial court's decision dealt directly with the Plaintiffs own
pleadings as well as the mainstream view among courts elsewhere. In Lokay v. Lehigh
Valley Cooperative Farmers, Inc., 492 A.2d 405, 410-411 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), for
example, the Pennsylvania appellate court concluded that the proper measure of damages
in a fraud claim like the instant one is the plaintiffs loss of salary and benefits from his
prior employment. Like Plaintiff, plaintiff Lokay asserted that he was induced to resign
from his prior employment (Topco) and join Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farmers
("Lehigh Valley") based on fraudulent misrepresentations concerning Lehigh Valley's
economic condition. Id. at 408. Lokay also claimed that Lehigh Valley breached his
contract in terminating him. Id. On appeal from a verdict for the plaintiff, the appellate
court observed that he had suffered two superficially related but nonetheless separate and
distinct injuries: he was fraudulently induced to quit his former employment with Topco,
and then was fired from his new employment with Lehigh Valley in breach of his
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employment contract. Id. at 410. The court then explained that the plaintiffs damages
for fraud were different from those for breach of contract:
[I]n an employment context lost future income is in fact what
the plaintiff loses when he is induced to leave an otherwise
on-going position; this is not the archetypal fraud fact-pattern
in which a plaintiff was tricked into buying something for
more than it was worth, or selling for less than that (citations
omitted). [Lokay's] loss of his salary and benefits from
Topco was the injury caused by [Lehigh Valley's] fraudulent
misrepresentations', his decrease in income following his
dismissal from [Lehigh Valley] was the damage from [Lehigh
Valley's] breach of contract.
Id, at 410-11 (emphasis added).8
Plaintiffs attempt to import a "benefit of the bargain" damages analysis into the
employment setting-permitting the recovery of basic contract damages where such
claims have all been dismissed-relies on fraud cases arising primarily in the context of
property sales. These cases stand for the uncontested, but irrelevant, proposition that a
victim of fraud is not required to disgorge benefits received under a contract before
seeking damages for fraud. None of these cases involve an at-will employee's effort to
recover forward-looking damages by alleging fraud in the inducement. For example,
As in Lokay, courts in other jurisdictions have similarly limited damages in an
employment fraud case to the income and benefits the plaintiff gave up when he or she
was fraudulently induced to accept new employment. See, e.g., Lam v. American Express
Co., 265 F. Supp. 2d 225, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (plaintiffs fraud damages were "actual
benefits to which he otherwise allegedly would have been entitled and which he waived
in order to accept" employment with defendant); Kidder v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 639 So.
2d 1361, 1363 (Ala. 1994) (recognizing plaintiff would be entitled to recover damages
for those losses she claimed resulted from her giving up the job she had in order to take
the job with defendant); Brooks v. Doherty, Rumble & Butler, 481 N.W.2d 120, 128-129
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (purpose of damages on a claim for fraudulent inducement of
employment is to "restore the plaintiff to his former status in life").
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Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 424 P.2d 136 (Utah 1967), concerned the plaintiffs contract for a
distributorship within a particular territory. The plaintiff paid $5,000 consideration for
the distributorship, and sought to recover $18,985 for out-of-pocket and punitive
damages based on the defendant's allegedly fraudulent material omission that defendant
failed to tell the plaintiff that there were already three other dealers operating in the same
territory. Id. at 137. The court held that damages, if any, were measurable by reference
to the value of the property interest purchased under the contract. Id. at 138. The court
rejected the plaintiffs claim for "out-of-pocket" expenses, including expected profits and
the value of his own time during the three months he operated his business, for failure to
show proximate cause. Id.
While Conder v. Williams & Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah 1987),
concerned a dispute in the employment arena, it did not involve an at-will employee who
had been terminated. In Conder, the plaintiff sued his former employer for fraudulent
inducement based on misrepresentations that he would have the opportunity to sell gold,
silver, real estate and other securities, in addition to insurance. Id. at 636. The appellate
court concluded that Plaintiff suffered at least "some damage" by virtue of his employer's
misrepresentation despite having continued in his employment for a year after learning
that his employer was "only an insurance agency," not "a full service financial
company." Id. at 640, 636-37. The Conder court did not address in any fashion the
correct measure of damages for fraudulent inducement of an at-will employee who is
subsequently lawfully terminated.
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In this regard, Plaintiffs reliance on McConkey v. Aon Corp., 804 A.2d 572 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) is equally misplaced. In McConkey, plaintiff alleged that
during his interview process, his prospective employer's Chief Executive Officer, Frank
Zarb, falsely assured plaintiff that the company was not going to be acquired. Id. at 578.
In response to direct questions by plaintiff about rumors he had heard to the contrary,
Zarb stated that such rumors were "totally unfounded." Id. In fact, at the same time as
he was making contrary assurances to plaintiff, Zarb was engaged in negotiations to sell
the company.

Id. at 579-82.

Within seven months of being hired, plaintiff was

terminated in a layoff resulting from the company's sale. Id. at 584. Thus, plaintiff in
McConkey was wrongfully terminated as a preordained consequence of his employer's
misrepresentation. Here, Plaintiff was not wrongfully terminated at all-Defendant S WC
properly terminated Plaintiffs at-will employment based on performance-related issues,
thereby extinguishing any forward-looking contract-based damages. Plaintiffs damages
for any alleged fraudulent inducement are therefore limited to those arising out of his
relinquishment of his prior employment at Cambric, damages the trial court found that
Plaintiff utterly failed to establish.9

9

In challenging the trial court's ruling on his fraudulent inducement claim, Plaintiff
raises yet again that his contract was for a guaranteed term of twelve months. (PI. Br.
40-42). Even if this were true, which it plainly is not, it would have no bearing on the
trial court's ruling regarding Count I-that the proper measure of damages for fraudulent
inducement in an employment setting is the difference in compensation between the
position that the employee left and the position he was allegedly induced to take.
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Plaintiff further argues that by holding that in order to establish damages "it is
incumbent upon Mr. Giusti to compare the income he earned post Cambric with what he
earned while employed there" (PI. Br. 46), the trial court improperly placed the burden of
proving mitigation on Plaintiff, not the Defendants. In the first place, Plaintiff never
raised this argument below and, therefore, waived it on this appeal. 438 Main Street v.
Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, \ 51, 99 P.3d 801, 813 (to preserve an issue for appeal,
among other things, "the issue must be specifically raised" in the trial court). In addition,
however, Plaintiffs argument entirely misses the mark.

A plaintiffs obligation to

establish damages is a prerequisite to surviving summary judgment and has nothing to do
with mitigation. The trial court correctly held that to make out a claim for fraudulent
inducement, Plaintiff must establish damages. (R. 705). Because he had no viable claim
that he had been wrongfully terminated as an at-will employee, Plaintiff had to
demonstrate that his purported fraudulent inducement resulted in lower compensation
than had he remained and Cambric. Plaintiff failed to do this.
Finally, in an effort to salvage his claim, Plaintiff offers a smattering of issues he
contends raise questions of fact the trial court overlooked. Plaintiff is wrong. First,
Plaintiff contends that the trial court's Order dated April 21, 2006, incorrectly stated that
Plaintiffs salary at Cambric was $125,000. (PI. Br. 44). In fact, in his opposition to
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff stated it was "undisputed" that,
"Giusti's salary at Cambric was $125,000 per year." (R. 3674 % 2). Even if Plaintiff s
salary at Cambric had been $135,000, the trial court's ruling that Plaintiffs earnings
subsequent to leaving Cambric were greater than his Cambric earnings would still be
33

correct. As the trial court found, Plaintiffs annual salary at SWC was $180,000 and his
annual salary at Callware was $125,000 plus commissions and bonuses. (R. 3923).
Thus, the aggregate of compensation from SWC and Callware plainly exceeded that at
Cambric.
Plaintiff also claims that the trial court improperly ruled that Plaintiffs reliance on
potential future bonuses he would have earned at Cambric was unfounded due to the
speculative nature of such bonuses. (PI. Br. 45-46). The trial court's ruling was correct
because there is nothing in the record that provides a basis for concluding that Cambric's
future economic performance as well as Plaintiffs future performance at Cambric would
have resulted in any bonus. As the lower court stated:
While Mr. Giusti relies upon claims for potential bonuses
from Cambric, such claimed damages are speculative at best
and cannot be proven with the requisite "reasonably
certainty" because they are tied to the company's future
economic performance as well as the plaintiffs future
performance. It is not the possible bonus income but the
received income that establishes the measure for damages.
(R. 3824).
Plaintiffs attempt to argue that there is a "factual issue" over whether he would
have received an additional bonus at Cambric is simply untrue. Having failed to elicit
any testimony or other evidence below establishing any basis to conclude that he would
have received future bonuses, Plaintiff cannot now claim that this issue raised disputed
issues of fact.10

Significantly, while Plaintiff deposed Timothy P. Hayes, Cambric's President and
Chief Executive Officer, Plaintiff chose not to elicit any testimony regarding whether
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Finally, Plaintiffs argument that the trial court failed to acknowledge the fact that
Plaintiffs compensation at Cambric included a monthly car allowance of $800 is
incorrect. (PI. Br. 45). Once again, the record betrays Plaintiffs argument. In its Order
of April 21, 2006, the trial court expressly recognized that, "At Cambric Mr. Giusti
earned a $125,000 annual salary plus an $800 per month car allowance and was eligible
for periodic bonuses." (R. 3923). As set forth above, this additional component of
Plaintiffs compensation at Cambric does not disrupt the trial court's conclusion that
Plaintiff had not established any damages.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ON COUNT V, PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
Plaintiffs fifth cause of action alleged that Defendants Hyde and Erickson

tortiously interfered with Plaintiffs employment relations with SWC by terminating
Plaintiff based on Defendants' personal reasons and without any legitimate business
justification.

(R. 77 f 61).11 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of

Defendants on this claim, holding that: a) Hyde and Erickson were plainly employees of
SWC; b) the hiring and firing of employees was clearly within the scope of Defendants'
employment; and c) it was clear that "there is no evidence to establish that the
Cambric's financial performance subsequent to Plaintiffs resignation would have
triggered the payment of any bonus to Plaintiff had he remained.
11

Count V of the Amended Complaint also included a separate claim for defamation
based on a series of statements allegedly made by Defendants Hyde and Erickson. (R.
77-78). In its Order of September 15, 2005, the trial court, treating the defamation
allegations as a discrete cause of action, granted Defendants' motion for summary
judgment. (R. 3736-37). Plaintiff has not challenged this ruling on appeal.
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termination of the plaintiff was based solely on a personal motivation by either Erickson
or Hyde." (R. 3736). Plaintiffs contention that the trial court's ruling was in error finds
no support in the law or in the record below.
Plaintiff first argues,
Although the district court held that "[T]here is no question that Erickson
and Hyde were employees of SWC," Plaintiff Giusti presented evidence
that Hyde was an executive of SunGard at the time of Giusti's termination.
See, ^f 13, Statement of Facts at 14. Thus, the district court erred by failing
to consider this evidence or by improperly resolving the parties' conflicting
evidence on this issue against Plaintiff Giusti.
(PI. Br. 47).
It is hard to comprehend the nature of Plaintiffs argument. Whether Defendant Hyde
was an executive of SunGard does not alter the fact that he was an employee of SWC, nor
does it undermine the trial court's analysis. As the trial court correctly concluded, if the
defendant is an employee of the entity with which a plaintiff claims he had an economic
relationship, plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted outside the scope of his
employment for purely personal reasons. (R. 3735); see also, Lichtie v. U.S. Home
Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1026, 1028 (D. Utah 1987); Yu v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 1991
WL 355137, *6 (D. Utah June 11, 1991). Plaintiff fails altogether to cite any authority
for the proposition that if the defendant employee is also an executive in the parent
company, that the analysis somehow changes. To the extent there was "conflicting
evidence" on the issue of whether Hyde was an executive of SunGard, the issue is of no
moment to the trial court's ruling that Hyde and Erickson, as employees of SWC, were
acting within the scope of their employment in terminating Plaintiff.
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Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in holding that there was no
evidence offered by Plaintiff to establish that the termination of plaintiff was based solely
on a personal motivation by either Hyde or Erickson. (PI. Br. 47-48). First, Plaintiff
does not, nor could he, challenge the correctness of the lower court's legal analysis. As
the Lichtie court ruled, under Section 236 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY,
even if a defendant acts with mixed motives, which are in part driven by personal
interests, a plaintiff cannot prevail: "[I]f an agent acts with mixed motives his or her
conduct will be within the scope of employment." Lichtie, 655 F. Supp. at 1028. As the
trial court recognized, "Case law is clear that to be outside the scope of authority, the
employee must act from a purely personal motive in no way connected with the
employer's interest." (R. 3735, citing Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053, 105657 (Utah 1989)).
Second, Plaintiff does not, nor could he, argue that termination of an employee is
outside the scope of the supervisor's employment. The question of whether an employee
is acting within the scope of his authority has arisen in many other Utah cases. In Nunez
v. Albo, M.D., 2002 UT App. 247, \ 18, 53 P.3d 2, the Utah Court of Appeals applied the
same legal principles as Lichtie in affirming summary judgment for a doctor, determining
as a matter of law that he was acting within the scope of his employment. The Nunez
court held that an employee's conduct falls within the scope of employment if:
First, . . . the conduct is of the general kind the employee is
employed to perform . . . That means that an employee's acts
or conduct must be generally directed toward the
accomplishment of objectives within the scope of the
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employee's duties and authority, or reasonably incidental
thereto . . . .
Second, the employee's conduct . . . occurs within the hours
of the employee's work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of
the e m p l o y m e n t . . . .
Third, the employee's conduct is motivated, at least in part,
by the purpose of serving the employer's interest.
Id. at f 12 (citing Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d at 1056-57 (to be acting outside
the scope of his authority, employee must act "from purely personal motives . . . in no
way connected with the employer's interests" or his conduct must be "unprovoked,
highly unusual, and quite outrageous")).
It is incontrovertible that, in the course of terminating Plaintiff, Defendants Hyde
and Erickson acted wholly within the scope of their authority. As SWC's Group CEO
and President, respectively, Hyde and Erickson were responsible for the operation of that
entity. Decisions regarding hiring and firing, and taking action in general with regard to
personnel, are part of the way in which management implements its duties and
accomplishes the goals of the company. Similarly obvious is that the conduct in question

Indeed, even where a defendant engages in fraudulent behavior, his conduct can still be
within the scope of employment. In Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon,
2002 UT 99, If 26, 61 P.3d 1009, 1017, the court held that: "Scope of authority 'refers to
those acts which are so closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so
fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though
quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of employment.' (Citations omitted,
emphasis added.) Accordingly, 'an agent does not cease to act within the course of his
employment merely because he engages in a fraud upon a third person; it is of no
consequence that he is deceiving the principal along with the third person.'"
Id.
(Citations omitted, emphasis added.)
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occurred within the hours of the employee's work and ordinary spatial boundaries of the
employment.
Third, whether a plaintiff has established that a defendant's motive in terminating
the plaintiff is purely personal is one that can be decided on a motion for summary
judgment. As the Utah Supreme Court held in Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125,
127 (Utah 1994): "[W]hen the employee's activity is so clearly within or outside the
scope of employment that reasonable minds cannot differ, the court may decide the issue
as a matter of law."
Here, the trial court easily reached the conclusion that "there is no evidence to
establish that the termination of the plaintiff was based solely on a personal motivation by
either Erickson or Hyde."

(R. 3736) (emphasis added).

Indeed, the record below

overwhelmingly established that Plaintiffs termination was in furtherance of SWC's
interests. Hyde's deposition testimony made clear that his dissatisfaction with Plaintiff
was based on a variety of performance-based issues including that: 1) Plaintiff was not
active enough in driving revenue and closing deals for the company; 2) Plaintiff was not
sufficiently familiar with SWC's products; 3) some of the salespeople had complained
about Plaintiff; and 4) Plaintiff was not effective in promoting SWC's products,
motivating and training the sales organization, dealing with customers, helping to close
deals, and interacting with team members. (R. 3680 ^f 18). In contemporaneous email
communications with Erickson, Hyde raised a host of concerns he had regarding
Plaintiffs performance:

39

[T]he four issues that I want to speak to with Steve are the
following: 1) Hitting our revenue targets. This does not
mean actively reporting on forecasts and pipelines. It means
driving revenue and getting the job done. I look to the vp of
sales as the one who ultimately puts the rock on his back and
carries it. He has to be actively DRIVING revenue and
taking ownership of the goals and making it happen. He
needs to know how to get in and close deals not just manage
and train reps. There is a big difference between the two. 2)
Credibility and confidence with his sales people. Bottom line
they are not responding well to his management style and
process. They do not view him as someone who is helping
them but rather is demanding a lot with not much in return.
This is probably my biggest concern. 3) He is not creating a
working relationship with the two people outside his
organization that he needs the most. Phil Harker and Chad
Gardner. He has alienated both. They have not readily
accepted him either but he has not found a way to work with
them and they need to be his biggest supporters. 4) He is
viewed by many in SWC as a bully and they do not like
working with him. This is again a style issue but is not
serving him well.
(R. 2753-54, 3684 If 20). On May 4, 2000, Hyde wrote to Erickson and reiterated his
concerns regarding Plaintiff:
For me all the warning signs are there right in front of us. 1)
He has no credibility with his own representative. 2) He
hasn't taken on a single deal and closed it in his 5 months
with the company. 3) He has spent less than 20 days on the
road in his first 5 months. 4) He still says he is coming up to
speed on our products and knows less about them than the
representatives. 5) He has alienated those that he needs the
most (Chad, Troy, Phil). 6) People don't like working with
him (Ami won't even talk to him unless she absolutely has
to). 7) He has not taken ownership of the revenue numbers.
8) He is not a leader he is a manager.
(R. 2754, 36861f 21).

40

There is no evidence in the record that Hyde's sole motivation in communicating
with Erickson regarding Plaintiffs performance was advancing Hyde's personal interestin fact, there is no evidence that this was even a part of his motivation. All of the
evidence reflects that Hyde's concerns about Plaintiff were purely business related and
plainly within the scope of Hyde's employment. To the extent that Plaintiff-like the
plaintiff in Lichtie-has hypothesized that he was made a "scapegoat" to divert blame
from Hyde, there is simply no record support for this invention. Although Plaintiff
deposed Robert Greifeld, Hyde's supervisor at the time, there is no testimony from
Greifeld or any other witness suggesting that Hyde's position was ever in jeopardy or
that, absent Plaintiffs termination, Hyde would have suffered repercussions from SWC's
performance. In this respect, this case is even further removed from Lichtie where, as
discussed in detail below, the court concluded that it was clear that the plaintiffs poor
performance would have been detrimental to his superior's standing with the company.
Erickson testified that his dissatisfaction with Plaintiff was based on concerns
different from Hyde's, and culminated in Plaintiffs refusal to commit to any set of
revenue targets by which he would be willing to be measured.

More specifically,

Erickson explained that, despite Hyde's dissatisfaction with Plaintiff, Erickson was
prepared to retain Plaintiff if he would: 1) commit to specific revenue targets to be set by
Plaintiff; and 2) devise a plan to accomplish the revenue goals. (R. 2755, 3686 If 22). By
May 2000, Erickson was looking for a statement of confidence, direction and energy
from Plaintiff. (R. 2755, 3686 \ 22). Plaintiffs failure to agree to a concrete set of
revenue goals or articulate a plan, coupled with his admission that he simply did not
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know what to do to meet such goals, ultimately caused Erickson to terminate Plaintiff
(after Plaintiff turned down two alternative job proposals). (R. 2755, 3687 ][ 23).
Plainly, the record offers no support for the proposition that Erickson acted outside
the scope of his authority or that his sole motivation for terminating Plaintiff was to
advance Erickson's personal interest.

Moreover, as in Lichtie, Plaintiff has had

"adequate time to discover facts regarding [the defendants'] motivation in terminating
[him], but [has] not come forward with sufficient evidence to enable a reasonable jury to
rule in [his] favor on that essential element." Lichtie, 655 F. Supp. at 1028 n.l. The facts
in this case are even more compelling than those presented in Lichtie, where the court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on a claim of tortious interference
involving remarkably similar allegations. The plaintiffs in Lichtie alleged that Walter
Wood, the president of the Interstate Division of Defendant U.S. Home Corporation
("U.S. Home"), "wrongfully, intentionally, and maliciously induced and persuaded" U.S.
Home to terminate their employment. 655 F. Supp at 1027. Plaintiffs alleged that Wood,
in order to save his own job, and acting outside the scope of his authority, persuaded
Defendant Larry Kelly, an employee of U.S. Home, to interview various employees of
U.S. Home whom Wood knew had a grudge against Plaintiff Joseph Lichtie in evaluating
Lichtie's performance.

Id.

Plaintiffs further alleged that Wood thereby controlled

Kelly's investigation, which resulted in a false impression of Joseph Lichtie's
performance and the creation of plaintiffs as "scapegoats" for Wood's inadequacies thus saving Wood's job. Id. at 1027-28.
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On Wood's motion for summary judgment, the court quickly concluded that as
"president of the Interstate Division, [Wood] had authority to request that Kelly
investigate the performance of Joseph Lichtie." Id. at 1027-28. Citing Section 235 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY,

the court relied on the proposition that once it is

determined that the agent is doing the type of work he is authorized to perform, there is
an inference that the agent is working within the scope of his employment:
If...the servant...does the kind of act which he is authorized
to perform within working hours and at an authorized place,
there is an inference that he is acting with the scope of
employment.
Id.
The Lichtie court then addressed the second question in the analysis: whether
"furthering [his own] personal interests" was Wood's "sole motive" in requesting the
investigation.

In opposing summary judgment, the plaintiffs in Lichtie argued that

Wood's sole motivation was personal, citing as evidence Wood's statement that he
believed it possible that if Joseph Lichtie were not terminated, Wood may himself have
been terminated. Id. Wood testified in his deposition, however, that "he believed it was
in the best interest of U.S. Home for Joseph and Michael Lichtie to be terminated,"
acknowledging that he was "accountable for the overall operation." Id. The court, citing
Section 236 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, while recognizing that "it is
clear that poor performance by Joseph Lichtie would be detrimental to Wood's standing
with U.S. Home," concluded that based on the evidence, "a jury could not properly
conclude that Wood's sole motivation was personal interest." Id. (emphasis in original)

43

Therefore, defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the claim for tortious
interference. Id.
Plaintiffs self-serving allegations that Hyde and Erickson were part of some
sweeping conspiracy to blame Plaintiff for their own failings find no support in the
record. As in Lichtie, such unsupported accusations cannot overcome a motion for
summary judgment. The trial court's ruling in this respect was proper and should be
affirmed.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS THEIR
ATTORNEY'S FEES WHERE THEY SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDED
AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS; UNDER UTAH'S RECIPROCITY
STATUTE, DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO FEES.
Under Utah law, where there is a right to attorney's fees in a written contract or

other writing and the provisions of the written document allow at least one party to
recover attorney's fees, the other party is entitled to fees under Utah's reciprocity statute,
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-27-56.5; Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 163 P.3d 728 (Utah

2007).
In Bilanzich, the plaintiff filed an action seeking to have a personal guaranty
provided to the defendants declared unenforceable due to the nonoccurrence of a
condition precedent to the guaranty. Bilanzich had made the personal guaranty of a
secured promissory note evidencing a loan by the defendants to REI. The guaranty
included a unilateral provision that granted to the defendants any "costs, expenses and
attorney's fees incurred in collection of the [underlying] Note and realization of the
security." 2007 UT 26, If 4. The lower court ruled for Bilanzich, holding that the
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guaranty was unenforceable but denied Bilanzich's attempt to obtain his attorney's fees
pursuant to 78-27-56.5 and the terms of the guaranty. Id. ^f 6. The Utah Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the lower court "may award attorney's fees and costs to Bilanzich
as the prevailing party because the litigation was based on a writing that granted
attorney's fees to at least one of the parties in the litigation." Id. \ 16. The court rejected
the defendants' argument that the guaranty, not the underlying note (referenced as the
basis for an award of fees to defendants) was at issue, stating:
This attempt to draw such a fine distinction fails because it ignores
the fact that a personal guaranty does not exist in a vacuum. The
guaranty extends liability under the note, and an action to enforce
the guaranty is necessarily an attempt to collect on the obligation
under the note.
A/. If 16 n. 5.
Thus this Court looked at the full picture of the claims involved in the litigation in
determining that a right to attorney's fees in one document in the litigation should be
reciprocal as to other parties where the document is integral in resolving the claims.
Attorney's fees are authorized in this case under the SWC Employment
Agreement. (R. 4157-4160). Specifically, section 7.3 provides:
In the event either party defaults in any of the terms or provisions of
this Agreement the non-defaulting party shall be entitled to recover its,
his or her reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred, whether or not
suit is commenced or final judgment obtained.
(R.4160).
Such fee provisions should not be construed narrowly. See, e.g. Clegg v. Lee, 516
P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1973) (Utah Supreme Court ruled defendant entitled to attorney's
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fees where it "sought to avoid and not to enforce the contract" although fee provision
provided fees for nondefaulting party); accord Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 993
P.2d 222, 226 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (where agreement provided for fees "in the event of
default by Dejavue," Dejavue "entitled to award of attorney's fees if it indeed prevailed
on either its own breach of contract claim, or in defending against. . . breach of contract
counterclaim"). "Utah courts have allowed the party who successfully prosecuted or
defended against a claim to recover the fees attributable to those claims on which the
party was successful." Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Savings Bank v. Nehr, 791 P.2d 217,
221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added).
The parties' briefing on the attorney's fees issue was completed before this Court
issued the Bilanzich decision.13 The trial court, without the benefit of the Bilanzich
reasoning, concluded that Defendants failed to provide any case law or statute which
"supports their position that a non-defaulting party is equivalent to a prevailing party
when the terms of the contract specifically provide that the non-defaulting party is
entitled to recover their fees." (R. 4435). In making this determination, the trial court
concluded that there was a "clear distinction between the terms 'default' and 'prevail' as
defined by Black's Law Dictionary (prevailing party is "a party in whose judgment is
rendered" and prevail is "to obtain the relief sought in an action"). (R. 4434).

11

Apparently the defendant did not argue and/or the Court of Appeals did not consider
the Bilanzich decision in a more recent case, Papanikolas Bros. Enter, v. Wendy's Old
Fashioned Hamburgers of New York, 2007 UT App. 211, 163 P.3d 728.
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There was no dispute that Defendants were the prevailing party but the trial court
concluded that because Plaintiff was "not a defaulting party," Defendants were not
entitled to fees.

(R. 4434). Under the trial court's ruling, unless Defendants sued

Plaintiff for breach of the SWC Employment Agreement or for a declaratory judgment
enforcing the at-will provision of the agreement, as opposed to relying on it to
successfully defend against Plaintiffs claims, they cannot recover attorney's fees.
Bilanzich reconciles this inconsistency.
Defendants respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling that
the SWC Employment Agreement did not provide for attorney's fees to Defendants and
remand for the court to consider the remaining arguments.14

VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' ENTIRE
REQUEST FOR COSTS.
Defendants were entitled to their costs under Rule 54(d) and Section 7.3 of the
SWC Employment Agreement. The trial court incorrectly held that (i) Rule 54(d) did not
provide for costs other than the $55.00 the court awarded for witness fees and (2) Rule
7.3 of the Employment Agreement was inapplicable. (R. 4456-58).

The trial court did not reach the issue of whether Defendants are entitled to fees
relating to defending against all of Plaintiffs claims. Every one of Plaintiffs claims
involves his employment relationship, which, in turn, is inextricably tied to his
employment agreement. (R. 4148-4175; 4356-4374); see also, Keith Jorgensen's, Inc. v.
Ogden City Mall Co., 26 P.3d 872, 889 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) ("[Pjarties are entitled to
fees when compensable and non-compensable claims overlap."); Dejavue, 993 P.2d at
227 (when multiple claims "involving a common core of acts and related legal theories"
are brought and a party prevails, that party is entitled to "compensation for all attorney's
fees reasonably incurred in the litigation."). The trial court also did not address the
reasonableness of Defendants' fee request. (R. 4356-4374).
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A.

The Trial Court Erred in Holding Defendants' Costs Were Not
Necessary Under Rule 54(d).

Rule 54(d) provides that costs are awarded as a matter of course to the prevailing
party and requires that the trial court assess costs based on a verified memorandum.
UTAH R. Civ. P. 54(d). Awardable costs include deposition costs that are taken in good
faith and necessary for the development and presentation of the case. Frampton v.
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980); see also, Highland Const. Co. v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1052 (Utah 1984). Even though the trial court found the
depositions were taken in good faith, it did not find the deposition costs were necessary.
(R. 4456-58).
Defendants' Verified Memorandum of Costs requested total costs of $13,329.56.
(R. 4378-4382). Of that amount, $11,289.96 was for deposition costs for ten individuals;
the remaining $2,039.60 consisted of photocopy costs, Westlaw charges and witness fees.
(R. 4347-4382).15

The trial court denied Defendants' request for

deposition costs,

finding that even though they were taken in good faith, Defendants did not establish that
the extensive length of the Plaintiffs deposition was essential because (i) Plaintiffs
deposition went over seven different sessions; (ii) Defendants did not establish that the
extensive length of Plaintiff s deposition was essential for the development of the case;
and (iii) there was no method to parse out what portion of costs may be essential for
presentation of the case. (R. 4457; 4379).

Defendants appeal only the denial of deposition costs under Rule 54(d) but appeal the
denial of all costs under the SWC Employment Agreement.
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The trial court's determination was incorrect. Plaintiff filed a Complaint which
contained six causes of action, ultimately seeking about $12 Million in damages. (58-98;
4400-4408). Because of the factual nature of the claims (e.g., fraud in the inducement,
defamation and interference with employment relations), the depositions were critical to
understanding the factual predicate of each cause of action and allowed Defendants to
successfully move for dismissal of every one of Plaintiffs claims except one that was
voluntarily dismissed. On his defamation claim alone, Plaintiff testified regarding 31
allegedly defamatory statements (R. 2755-2763) after he created a written summary of
the alleged defamatory statements which then became the subject of questioning. (R.
4410-15). Plaintiff himself had to continue depositions over multiple days to obtain all
the necessary information. (R. 4379—Erickson and Gardner deposition continued over
two-three days).
Additionally, the trial court failed to recognize the length of Plaintiff s deposition
was due in large part to his obstructionist behavior. Plaintiff was deposed over seven
sessions because of his style of responding, including his giving long, speech-like
answers, which further prolonged the deposition. (R. 4416-4420). Persistent questioning
was required to elicit the information from Plaintiff; there was no less-expensive means
to obtain this information. Similarly, Plaintiffs piecemeal production of information and
documents, as evidenced by no less than eight supplemental disclosures, required
continuation of his deposition.(R. 2558-59).
Finally, the trial court failed to address why costs were not allowed for the other
nine depositions and failed to ask either party to apportion alleged unnecessary from
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necessary deposition costs—something that could have been done. For these reasons, the
trial court unreasonably failed to recognize that depositions costs were necessary.
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Denying Defendants an Award of Costs
Based on the SWC Employment Agreement.

The trial court denied Defendants' cost request under the SWC Employment
Agreement for the same reason that it denied the attorney's fees request-it concluded that
the attorney's fees and cost provision was inapplicable. (R. 4456-58). Should this Court
determine that Section 7.3 of the Agreement provides for attorney's fees {see supra
section V), Defendants will also be entitled to the costs referenced in the Verified
Memorandum and the additional cost of Defendants' expert fee, which was necessarily
incurred to address the analysis and conclusions raised by Plaintiffs expert witness and
to opine on other, critical issues related to the damages Plaintiff sought. (R. 4427-29 f
3). Since costs under Section 7.3 should have been rewarded regardless of whether suit
was commenced or final judgment obtained, any costs incurred by Defendants in
defending against Plaintiffs claims were allowable under the Agreement and are not
limited by Rule 54(d). Chase v. Scott, 38 P.3d 1001, 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants respectfully request that Plaintiffs
appeal be denied in its entirety, thereby affirming the decisions of the trial court; that this
Court reverse the trial court's decision denying Defendants their costs and attorney's
fees; and grant Defendants their costs and fees incurred in this appeal.
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Litster v. Alza Corp.
D.Utah,2006.
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,D. Utah,Central Division.
Megan LITSTER, et al, Plaintiffs,
v.
ALZA CORP, et al., Defendants.
No. 2:05-CV-1077 TS.
Nov. 15,2006.
George T. Waddoups, Nancy A. Mismash, Robert
J. Debry & Associates, Salt Lake City, UT, for
Plaintiffs.
John A. Anderson, Stoel Rives, Salt Lake City, UT,
Michael C. Zellers, Mollie F. Benedict, Tucker Ellis & West, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND
TED STEWART, District Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
*1 This matter comes before the Court on a
Motion to Amend.FN1 Plaintiffs seeks leave of the
Court to amend their complaint to add Johnson and
Johnson ("J & J"), the parent corporation of the
other named Defendants, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a).
Specifically, Plaintiffs state that "[s]ince [the original filing] the parties have engaged in discovery
and it appears that the plaintiffs have a factual and
legal basis for an additional claim."Plaintiffs, in effect, seek to incorporate J & J into its existing
claims of wrongful death, negligent misrepresentation, fraud and deceit, and for punitive damages related to allegedly defective drug patches.
FNl.DocketNo. 15.
II. DISCUSSION
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J & J opposes Plaintiffs' motion, claiming that
amendment would be futile for two reasons: (A)
there is no personal jurisdiction over J & J as to any
claim, and the claims are therefore subject to dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), and (B) even if
there were personal jurisdiction, the two year statutes of limitations FN2 for Plaintiffs' wrongful
death claims have run, and Plaintiffs cannot properly relate back the proposed amended complaint
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). Under this latter scenario, Plaintiffs' claims would then be subject to a
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal.
FN2.Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) states that leave to amend
"shall be freely given when justice so requires."However, leave to amend is not warranted
when the filing of an amended complaint would be
futile.FN3A proposed amendment is futile if it cannot survive a motion to dismiss.FN4
FN3.Frank v West, Inc,
1365 (10th Cir.1993).

3 F.3d

1357,

FN4 Jefferson County Sch Dist No R-l v
Moody's Investor's Servs., 175 F.3d 848,
859 (10th Cir. 1999).
A. Personal Jurisdiction
J & J argues that there is no personal jurisdiction over it in this action, and has attached the affidavit of Douglas Chia, the Assistant Secretary of J
& J, to support this assertion.
"The ... court is given discretion in determining
the procedure to employ in considering a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.... Facts regarding
jurisdictional questions may be determined by reference to affidavits [,] evidentiary hearing[,] trial[,]"FN5 or "jurisdictional discovery" where "facts
are controverted or a more satisfactory showing of
the facts is necessary."FN6"When the evidence
presented on the motion to dismiss consists of affi-
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davits and other written materials, the plaintiff need
only make a prima facie showing."FN7"The allegations in the complaint must be taken as true to the
extent they are uncontroverted by the defendant's
affidavits. If the parties present conflicting affidavits, all factual disputes are resolved in the
plaintiffs favor...."FN8
FN5. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Oaklawn
Apartments,
959 F.2d 170, 174 (10th
Cir.1992).
FN6. World Wide Ass'n of Specialty Programs and Schs. v. Houlahan, No 04-4181,
2005 WL 1097321, at *3 (10th Cir. May
10, 2005).
FN7.£e// Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Heliqwest Int'l, Ltd., 385 F.3d 1291, 1295
(10thCir.2004).
FN8.Kennedy v. Freeman, 919 F.2d 126,
128 (10th Cir. 1990).
" 'To obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a diversity action, a plaintiff
must show that jurisdiction is legitimate under the
laws of the forum state and that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.' " FN9 "It is frequently
helpful to undertake the due process analysis first,
because any set of circumstances that satisfies due
process will also satisfy the long-arm statute." FN 10
¥N9.Soma
Med.
Int'l
v.
Standard
Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1295
(10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Far West Capital,
Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1074 (10th
Cir. 1995)).
FNIO-Sys. Designs, Inc. v. New Customward Co., 248 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1097
(D.Utah 2003).
*2 To satisfy the constitutional requirement of
due process there must be "minimum contacts"
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between
the
defendant
and
the
forum
state.FN1'The "minimum contacts" standard may
be met by a finding of either general jurisdiction or
specific jurisdiction. For general jurisdiction to exist, " 'the defendant must be conducting substantial
and continuous local activity in the forum state.' "
FN 12 A number of factors are relevant to the issue
of whether general personal jurisdiction exists, including whether the defendant is: (1) engaged in
business in this state; (2) licensed to do business in
this state; (3) owning, leasing, or controlling property or assets in this state; (4) maintaining employees, offices, agents, or bank accounts in this state;
(5) shareholders reside in this state; (6) maintaining
phone or fax listings within this state; (7) advertising or soliciting business in this state; (8) traveling to this state by way of salespersons; (9) paying
taxes in this state; (10) visiting potential customers
in this state; (11) recruiting employees in the state;
and (12) generating a substantial percentage of its
national sales through revenue generated from instate customers.™13
FN11. World-Wide
Volkswagen
Co.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).

v.

FNU.Soma, 196 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Arguello v. Woodworking Mack Co., 838
P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992)).
FN 13.Id at 1295-96 (citing Buddensick v
Stateline Hotel, Inc, 972 P.2d 928, 930-31
(Utah Ct.App. 1998)).
Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint asserts
J & J does business, has an actual or constructive
presence, solicits business, and actively markets
and sells the product at issue in the case in the State
of Utah. Plaintiffs also argue that there is such
unity of interest between J & J and the other named
defendants that all entities have become the alterego of one another.
J & J, through the Chia Affidavit, counters that
it does no business in Utah, has no offices in Utah,
solicits no business in Utah, owns no property in
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Utah, employs no employees or agents in Utah, is
not registered to conduct business in Utah, and does
not sell, manufacture, or market any product in
Utah or any other state. Moreover, J & J details its
independence from its wholly owned subsidiaries
by asserting that it has a different board of directors
and officers, is financially independent from Defendants, and is not involved in the day-to-day operations of the other named defendants. J & J states
that it is merely a holding company for its owned
subsidiaries.
Plaintiffs do not set forth any affidavits of their
own, and largely ignore the evidence raised by the
Chia Affidavit. Nonetheless, as it relates to general
jurisdiction, Plaintiff requests the Court to grant it
the opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery.
Plaintiffs cite sources which broadly characterize J
& J's national advertising expenses, and assert that,
given the opportunity, they could discover advertising directed to the Utah market. However,
Plaintiffs' broad assertions regarding J & J's national advertising are not sufficient to demonstrate a
factual issue as to general jurisdiction here. Regarding Plaintiffs' alter ego theory, while it is true that
u
[c]ompanies conducting business through their
subsidiaries can qualify as transacting business in a
state, provided the parent exercises sufficient control over the subsidiary[,]"FN14 Plaintiffs have
pointed to no evidence of control by J & J over its
subsidiaries to establish a factual issue. Accordingly, the Court is unconvinced there is any factual
issue with regard to general jurisdiction, or that jurisdictional discovery would allow Plaintiffs to produce sufficient evidence on the matter of general
personal jurisdiction to survive a motion to dismiss.
There is simply no evidence here of substantial and
continuous local activity by J & J in the forum state.
FN 14. Pro Axess, Inc. v. Or lux Distribution, Inc., 428 F.3d 1270, 1278 (10th
Cir.2005).
*3 Plaintiffs further fail to demonstrate factual
issues as to specific jurisdiction. When a
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"defendant has 'purposely directed' his activities at
residents of the forum," courts in that state may exercise specific jurisdiction in cases that "arise out
of or relate to those activities."FN,5In order for the
Court to find specific jurisdiction, there must be
"some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws."FN16
FN 15.Burger King v Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462,472-73(1985).
¥N\6.Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint asserts
that J & J manufactured, sold, distributed, promoted, and placed in the stream of commerce the
drug product at issue. However, the Chia Affidavit
asserts that J & J, as a holding company, manufactures or distributes no products. Plaintiffs again fail
to address the assertions in the Chia Affidavit, but
has asked for jurisdictional discovery on the issue
of specific jurisdiction.
To attempt to show that discovery would be
fruitful, Plaintiffs cite several past or ongoing court
cases in Utah in which J & J is a party. However,
Plaintiffs fail to establish, or even argue, how those
contacts are related in any way to its proposed
amended claims against J & J in this
ease.FNl7Plaintiffs also assert that jurisdictional
discovery could produce evidence to establish minimum contacts in this case because J & J maintains
interactive websites for health care professionals
which both provide information and allow such persons to order and track shipping of J & J products.
However, the provision of information is passive
activity, and Plaintiffs fail to provide any evidence
of whether the drug product at issue in this case
may even be obtained over such sites. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs have failed to establish that there is a factual issue as to specific personal jurisdiction which
would merit this Court granting jurisdictional discovery. Plaintiffs have not met their burden of suf-
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ficiently establishing minimum contacts by J & J in
this action. Therefore, Plaintiffs' proposed amendment would be subject to dismissal under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Because there are no factual
issues as to minimum contacts, the Court need not
address traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
FN 17."[A] court may ... assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if
the defendant has 'purposefully directed'
his activities at residents of the form, and
the litigation results from alleged injuries
that 'arise out of or relate to' those activities."0M7 Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co.
of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1090 (10th
Cir.1998) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S.
at 472).
B. Relation Back
Plaintiffs do not contest that the statutes of limitations have run as to the wrongful death claims,
but argue only that relation back would be proper.
An amendment adding a new party relates back to
the date of the original complaint only when all
three of the following are satisfied: (1) the amended
complaint involves the same transaction or occurrence as the original complaint; (2) the new party
had notice of the action and therefore suffers no
prejudice; and (3) the new party knew or should
have known that, but for a mistake concerning the
identity of the proper party, the action would have
been brought against the party.FN18
FN18.Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c); Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir.2004).
J & J argues that a mistake concerning the
identity of a proper party, as contemplated by the
rule, has not occurred here. J & J properly points
out that a lack of knowledge by Plaintiffs is not a
mistake in identity of a proper party of which J & J
should have been aware. More specifically, when
Plaintiffs state that "it appears that the plaintiffs
have a factual and legal basis for an additional
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claim," they are not stating that they have made a
mistake in identifying the proper party in this action. Rather, Plaintiffs appear to assert that because
they have learned some additional information in
discovery, they would like to add another party to
their claims, and, at the same time, avoid the implications of the statutes of limitations as it relates
to that party. This is not the type of mistake contemplated by Rule 15.FN19
FN\9.See,
e.g., Nelson v. Adams USA,
Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 467 n. 1 (2000)
(reasoning that no mistake when Plaintiff
knew of role and existence of party sought
to be added before seeking to amend its
pleadings); Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d
692, 696-97 (10th Cir.2004) (holding that a
plaintiffs lack of knowledge of the intended defendant's identity is not a mistake
concerning the identity of the proper
party); In re Estate of Kout v. United
States, 241 F.Supp.2d
1183, 1191-92
(D.Kan.2002) (holding that plaintiffs failure to name a doctor as a defendant was
based on lack of knowledge, not mistake,
where plaintiff mistook the status of the
known party, rather than its identity).
*4 While Plaintiffs cite the Travelers Indemnity
Co. v. United States
ex rel.
Construction
SpecialtiesFN20 case for the proposition that entities which have an identity of interest may be properly added under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15, Plaintiffs do not
address the distinction between lack of knowledge
and mistake of identity. Moreover, the instant case
may be distinguished from Travelers in that there,
unlike here: a clearly incorrect party for the claim
asserted was originally named; the mistakenly
named parent corporation sat on the knowledge of
the mistake until the applicable statute of limitations ran; the improperly named parent corporation
and sought-to-be-substituted subsidiary shared office space, managers, and directors; and substitution, not addition of, parties was requested by the
plaintiff.FN21 Plaintiffs' arguments are therefore in-
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apposite, and amendment to include J & J in the
wrongful death claims would be futile, subject to a
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and therefore, is not warranted.
FN20.382 F.2d 103 (10th Cir.1967),
FN2Ud

at 105-06.
III. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Plaintiffs' Motion will be denied
because: (1) Plaintiff has failed to controvert J & J's
affidavit, and has not sufficiently established factual issues as to general or specific subject matter jurisdiction as to any claims, and (2) because Plaintiffs
did not mistake the identity of a proper defendant,
they are not entitled to relate their wrongful death
claims back to their original filing, thus avoiding
the now-expired statute of limitations. It is there- fore
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Amend
(Docket No. 15) is DENIED.
D.Utah,2006.
Litster v. Alza Corp.
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 3327906
(D.Utah)
END OF DOCUMENT
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McNeill v. Geostar
D.Utah,2007.
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.Larry McNEILL, Plaintiff,
v.
GEOSTAR, First Source Wyoming, and Gastar Exploration Limited, Defendants.
No.2:06-CV-911TS.
May 29, 2007.
Daniel L. Berman, Kenneth W. Yeates, Kyle C.
Thompson, Berman & Savage PC, Salt Lake City,
UT, for Plaintiff.
Matthew L. Lalli, Peter H. Donaldson, Snell &
Wilmer, Jennifer Anderson Whitlock, Robert M.
Anderson, Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy,
Salt Lake City, UT, Benjamin F.S. Elmore, James
D. Thompson, III, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Houston,
TX, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANT GASTAR'S MOTION
TO DISMISS AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM
STEWART.
*1 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Gastar's Motion to Dismiss FNI and Plaintiffs
Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Gastar's Motion
to Dismiss.FN2This matter was set for hearing on
May 22, 2007; however, the hearing was stricken
because the Court determined that oral argument
would not facilitate the resolution of the issues before it. Having reviewed the submissions of the
parties, and being otherwise fully informed, the
Court will grant Defendant Gastar's Motion to Dismiss, and deny Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File
Supplemental Memorandum, as set forth more fully
below.
FNI.Docket No. 10.
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FN2.Docket No. 37.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants
GeoStar, First Source Wyoming,™3 and Gastar
Exploration Limited on October 25, 2006.FN4The
Complaint alleges five causes of action,™5 only
the fifth of which names Gastar-for declaratory
judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and Utah
Code Ann. § 78-33-1, et seq.
FN3. On January 19, 2007, Defendants
Geostar and First Source Wyoming filed
their Answer and Counterclaim against
Plaintiffs. Docket No. 13.
FN4.Docket No. 1.
FN5. Against GeoStar, Plaintiff claims
breach of contract, conversion of share of
stock and declaratory judgment. Against
First Source Wyoming, Plaintiff alleges
breach of contract. SeeDocket No. 1.
Defendant Gastar filed the instant Motion to
Dismiss on January 19, 2007, alleging that the
Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Gastar, and,
alternatively, that Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In response, Plaintiff requests that the Court allow discovery on the issue
of personal jurisdiction. FN6
FN6.Docket No. 23, at 1-4.
II. DISCUSSION
A. DEFENDANT GASTAR'S MOTION TO DISMISS
As noted, Defendant Gastar moves to dismiss
the Complaint against it on two grounds: 1) that the
Court lacks personal jurisdiction-either specific or
general-over it, and due process requires dismissal;
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and 2) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2 201. Gastar also opposes Plaintiffs request for discovery on the issue
of personal jurisdiction. The Court addresses each
argument, in turn. 1. Personal Jurisdiction
Plaintiff carries the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over Defendant.FN7U T o obtain
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
in a diversity action, a plaintiff must show that jurisdiction is legitimate under the laws of the forum
state and that the exercise of jurisdiction does not
offend the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' " FN8 "It is frequently helpful to undertake the due process analysis first, because any
set of circumstances that satisfies due process will
also satisfy the long-arm statute." FN9
FN7'.Kuenzle
v.
Freizeitgerdte
AG,
(10th Cir. 1996).

HTM
102 F.3d

SportUnd
453, 456

FN&.Soma
Med.
Int'l
v.
Standard
Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1295
(10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Far West Capital,
Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1074 (10th
Cir. 1995)).
FN9.Systems Designs, Inc. v. New Customward Co., 248 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1097
(D.Utah 2003).
To satisfy the constitutional requirement of due
process there must be "minimum contacts" between
the defendant and the forum state.FN,0"When the
evidence presented on the motion to dismiss consists of affidavits and other written materials, the
plaintiff
need only make a prima
facie
showing."FNll"The allegations in the complaint
must be taken as true to the extent they are uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits. If the parties
present conflicting affidavits, all factual disputes
are resolved in the plaintiffs favor...."FN12
FN10.World-Wide

Volkswagen

Co.

v.

Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
FN W.Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Heliqwest Intern., Ltd., 385 F.3d 1291, 1295
(10thCir.2004).
FNXl.Kennedy v. Freeman, 919 F.2d 126,
128 (10th Cir. 1990).
*2 The "minimum contacts" stan dard may be
met by a finding of either general jurisdiction or
specific jurisdiction. In this case, Plaintiff asserts
the Court has specific jurisdiction. When the
"defendant has 'purposely directed' his activities at
residents of the forum," courts in that state may exercise specific jurisdiction in cases that "arise out
of or relate to those activities.'™ 3 In order for the
Court to find specific jurisdiction, there must be
"some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws."FN14If the Court finds
that the Defendant had adequate minimum contacts
with the forum state, the Court must also determine
that personal jurisdiction is reasonable in light of
the circumstances surrounding the case, or, in other
words, that exercising jurisdiction would not offend
traditional notions of "fair play and substantial
justice." FN15"Courts
consider
the
following
factors to decide whether exercise of jurisdiction is
reasonable: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the
forum state's interest in resolving the dispute; (3)
the plaintiffs interest in receiving convenient and
effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive
policies."FN16
FN 13.Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462,472-73(1985).
FN14.Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958) (citation omitted).
Ym*>.Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
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¥N\6.Bell Helicopter, 385 F.3d at 1296.
Gastar's supporting Affidavit of its President
and CEO, J. Russell Porter FN17-which is entirely
uncontroverted by Plaintiff-asserts the following
jurisdictional facts:
FN17.DocketNo. 15.
• Gastar is organized and existing under the
laws of Alberta, Canada. Gastar's principal place of
business is located in Houston, Texas. Gastar does
not have a designated agent for service of process
in the State of Utah.
• Gastar does not maintain an office in Utah.
• Gastar does not have employees or agents
regularly assigned to do business for it in the State
of Utah.
• Gastar has not been qualified or applied to be
qualified to do business in the State of Utah.
• Gastar has not contracted with any resident of
Utah to perform any obligations in Utah.
• Gastar has not committed any tort, in whole
or in part, in the State of Utah.
• Gastar has not owned, used or possessed any
real property located in the State of Utah.
• Gastar maintains no bank accounts in Utah
and does not transact banking business in the States
of Utah.
• Gastar does not hold itself out as a Utah corporation, and has never done so. Gastar does not
market or advertise that it conducts operations in
Utah, as its operations are limited to Texas, West
Virginia, Wyoming, and Australia. FN18
FN18.DocketNo. 12, at 6-7;Docket No. 15.
In this case, Plaintiffs Complaint sets forth that
Gastar is a Canadian corporation with its principal
place of business if Houston, Texas. The facts before the Court further indicate that Gastar has no
business, operational, marketing, or other presence
in the State of Utah, and no contacts with the state.
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finds that it does not have personal jurisdiction over
Defendant Gastar, and will grant its Motion to Dismiss thereon.
2. Jurisdictional Discovery
In response to the personal jurisdiction argument in Gastar's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff requests, in the alternative, that the Court "stay ruling
on the motion until McNeill has been given the opportunity to conduct discovery on those issues ...
which will provide a sufficient basis for this Court
to rule properly on the jurisdictional issue."™19
FN19.DocketNo. 23, at 6.
The parties agree that the Court has discretion
to grant discovery on the limited basis of personal
jurisdiction.FN20Plaintiff
cites an unpublished
Tenth Circuit opinion for the proposition that "a refusal to grant discovery constitutes an abuse of discretion if either the pertinent jurisdictional facts are
controverted or a more satisfactory showing of the
facts is necessary."FN21 However, Gastar counters
that it is not an abuse of discretion when a plaintiff
makes a general request for jurisdictional discovery
in response to a motion to dismiss. Defendant also
suggests that such a request should be made by a
separate, supported motion, and not merely by a responsive assertion .FN22
FN20.See
Programs
Fed.Appx.
Cir.2005)
Grades v.
Fed.Appx.
1704454
opinion).

World Wide Assn. of Specialty
& Schs. v. Houlahan, 138
50, 2005 WL 1097321 (10th
(unpublished opinion); Health
Decatur Memorial Hospital, 190
586, 589, 2006 WL 170
(10th Cir.2006) (unpublished

FN21.Health Grades, 190 Fed.Appx. at 589.
FN22.Docket No. 27, at 3 (citing World
Wide, 138 Fed.Appx. at 52).

*3 Based upon the record before it, the Court
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Plaintiff argues that the Court should invoke its
discretion and allow limited jurisdictional discovery in this case because he has made a "colorable
claim
for
personal
jurisdiction"
over
Gastar.FN23To the contrary, the Court's ruling
above demonstrates that Plaintiff has not made a
colorable claim that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Gastar.
FN23.DocketNo. 23, at 4.
Moreover, the Court does not believe that jurisdictional discovery in this case would be fruitful,
because Plaintiff does not controvert the fact alleged by Gastar that it is not "doing business" in
Utah, or that Gastar had no control over GeoStar's
use or disposition of the share of Gastar common
stock owned by Gastar. Indeed, Plaintiff does not
assert that the Court has either general or specific
personal jurisdiction over Gastar, but raises an
"alter ego" theory to link Gastar to this case.
However, the Court concurs with Gastar that
"Plaintiffs claims, even if true, would not show the
degree of control by GeoStar over Gastar necessary
to give rise to jurisdiction over Gastar."FN24Further, Utah law establishes that the existence of officers and directors in common does not constitute
parental control of a subsidiary, or vice versa FN25
and that financing agreements and stock ownership
are not determinative of the issue.FN26
FN24.Docket No. 27, at 7 (internal citations omitted).
VN25.See Benton v. Cameco Corp,
F.3d 1070, 1081 (10th Cir.2004).
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¥N26.See Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc. 878 F .2d 1259, 1264
(10th Cir. 1989), McKinney v. Ga nnett Co,
817 F.2d 659, 665-666 (10th Cir. 1987),
and Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp, 618
F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1980).
The Court agrees with Gastar that Plaintiff has
not identified any controverted jurisdictional facts

which would warrant jurisdictional discovery, and
he may not rest on speculative or conclusory
claims.FN27Plaintiffs broad assertions under an alter ego theory are vague and conclusory-largely
stated "upon information and belief'-and do not
demonstrate
factual
disputes.™28
Nor
does
Plaintiff identify what discovery he seeks or why it
would be fruitful to the precise issues before the
Court. Therefore, the Court declines to allow discovery on the limited issue of personal jurisdiction
over Gastar in this matter.
FN27.&K? Litster v. Aha Corp., 2006 WL
3327906 (10th Cir.2006) (unpublished
opinion).
FN28.S«?A/. at*7-8.
3. 12(b)(6) Failure to State a Claim-Actual Case or
Controversy
*4 Given the Court's ruling above on the issue
of personal jurisdiction, the Court need not address
Gastar's alternative ground for dismissal-that
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, for lack for a showing of an actual case of controversy.

B. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
Likewise, given the Court's ruling above, the
Court will deny Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Gastar's Motion to Dismiss. The issue proposed to be discussed therein is not relevant to the
matter at hand, as it has not been raised by Defendant at this juncture. However, if the claim of an exclusive remedy, the Court may re-visit this issue.

III. CONCLUSION
Based upon the above, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Court will not allow limited discovery regarding personal jurisdiction over
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Gastar. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant Gastar's Motion to
Dismiss (Docket No. 10) is GRANTED, and
Plaintiffs claims against Gastar are dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to
File Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant Gastar's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
However, if the claim of an exclusive remedy
which was raised in the Motion becomes an issue in
this case, the Court may re-visit this issue.
SO ORDERED.
D.Utah,2007.
McNeill v. Geostar
Slip Copy, 2007 WL 1577671 (D.Utah)
END OF DOCUMENT
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Thompson v. Telco, Inc.
Tenn.App.,1999.
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
SEE COURT OF APPEALS RULES 11 AND 12
Court of Appeals of Tennessee.
Kerry THOMPSON, Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
TELCO, INC. Defendant/Appellant.
No. 01A01-9801-CH-00045.
July 29, 1999.
Williamson Chancery No. 23619
Appeal From The Chancery Court Of Williamson
County At Franklin, Tennessee The Honorable
Henry Denmark Bell, Chancellor.
Alan Mark Turk, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the
Defendant/Appellant.
Julie E. Officer, Nashville, Tennessee, for the
Plaintiff/Appelleek.
LILLARD.
*1 This case involves the alleged breach of an
employment contract. The plaintiff employee argued that a letter signed by him and the defendant
employer created a five-year employment contract.
The trial court found that the letter was an agreement for employment for a five-year term, awarded
the employee $62,235 for breach of contract, and
required the employee to pay into court unemployment compensation benefits he received. The employer appeals. We reverse and remand.
Plaintiff/Appellee
Kerry
Thompson
("Thompson") started working for Defendant/Appellant Telco, Inc. ("Telco") on April 10, 1992 as a
telephone repair technician. The parties executed a
document entitled "Terms of Employment Agreement between Kerry Thompson and Telco, Inc." on
that date, which read:
1) Telco will pay Kerry Thompson $10.00 per
hour.
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2) Kerry will be guaranteed a minimum $1.00
per hour raise per year over the next five (5) years.
3) Two weeks paid vacation per year (July &
December).
4) Two bonuses per year of $600 each on June
6th and Dec. 12th.
5) Telco agrees to pay insurance for Kerry
Thompson. Kerry will pay his own dependent insurance.
6) Weekly work hours will be 40 Hours. Minimum Telco will allow will be 5-10 hours overtime
per week as soon as demand requires it.
The letter was signed by Thompson and by
Gregory J. Wass ("Wass"). Wass was the manager
of Telco's telephone repair center and Thompson's
direct supervisor. Thompson worked for Telco until
August 8, 1995. The termination letter from Telco
dated August 9, 1995 states that Thompson was laid
off "due to lack of work." Thompson received unemployment benefits of approximately $5684.
Thompson filed a lawsuit on October 1 1, 1995
alleging breach of the letter agreement. He sought
lost wages and benefits allegedly due him under the
agreement. Telco's answer admitted the authenticity
of the letter agreement but denied that it constituted
a five-year employment contract. Telco maintained
that Thompson was an at-will employee and that
the agreement merely guaranteed a rate of compensation if Thompson remained employed. Telco
also raised several affirmative defenses, namely,
that Thompson breached the agreement by failing
to work forty hours a week and by failing to satisfactorily perform his duties, that the termination
letter was a valid accord and satisfaction, that
Thompson was estopped from filing suit, and the
statute of frauds.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Telco filed affidavits of the management personnel at Telco, as well as numerous employee records. Thompson also filed several affidavits, including his own. The trial court denied both mo-
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The bench trial commenced on November 6,
1996. Thompson was the sole witness on November
6 and was questioned extensively by his counsel
and opposing counsel. Thompson testified about his
employment at Telco. He denied requesting that his
termination be characterized as for "lack of work"
so that he could receive unemployment benefits. He
admitted, however, that by putting lack of work as
the reason for his termination, Telco made him eligible for unemployment benefits. He also admitted
that he received unemployment benefits. Although
Thompson did not believe that he had done anything for which Telco could terminate him, he acknowledged that he was told that he was being terminated for the reasons listed on the termination report, including violations of the employee
guidelines, unsatisfactory performance, and failure
to work forty hours per week.
*2 Thompson's counsel then closed his proof,
after which counsel for Telco made a motion to dismiss the complaint. The trial court adjourned to
consider the motion and read the parties' pre-trial
briefs, which were not made part of the record on
appeal.
At the beginning of the next day of trial, the
trial judge sua sponte entered an order finding that,
in agreeing on "lack of work" as a cause for termination, the parties "may have" violated Tennessee
Code Annotated § 50-7-709, which sets forth a
criminal penalty for a misrepresentation in order to
receive unemployment compensation.FN1The trial
court ordered the county district attorney to investigate the case. In addition, the trial court struck
Telco's affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction regarding the termination letter because the defense was based on a fraudulent contract to obtain
unemployment benefits and ordered Thompson to
reimburse the Department of Employment Security
for the amount of unemployment benefits he had received, plus interest, within thirty days. The order
also provided that if Thompson failed to remit the
monies within thirty days, the trial court would dis-
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miss the complaint. Court was then adjourned.
There was no further testimony before court adjourned.
FN 1.Tennessee
Code
Annotated
§
50-7-709 reads:
Misrepresentation to obtain benefits-Penalty.
(a) Whoever makes a false statement or representation knowing it to be false or knowingly fails to
disclose a material fact, to obtain or increase any
benefit or other payment under this chapter, either
for himself or for any other person, commits a
Class C misdemeanor; and each such false statement or representation or failure to disclose a material fact constitutes a separate offense.
(b) All prosecutions for offenses defined by
this section shall be commenced within two (2)
years, next, after the commission of the offense.
Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-7-709 (1991).
Based on circumstances unrelated to the employment compensation, Thompson's counsel filed
a motion for extension of time for dismissal of
Plaintiffs case with a supporting affidavit on
December 18, 1996. On that same day Thompson's
counsel filed a motion to alter or amend, arguing
that Telco, not Thompson, prepared the termination
letter and thus should be responsible for reimbursing the Department of Employment Security. The
motion also requested permission for the funds to
be paid to the clerk and master of the court until final disposition of the case. Telco filed a response to
Thompson's motion, denying that it violated Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-7-709, and arguing
that the statute does not provide that the employer
must reimburse the State for unemployment benefits fraudulently received by the employee. The trial
court denied Thompson's motion to alter or amend,
but granted the motion for an extension.
In January, 1997, the trial court entered another
order, noting that the Department of Employment
Security would not accept the funds and allowing
Thompson to pay the funds to the clerk and master
of the court. After the funds were paid, trial was reset for November, 1997.
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At trial, the parties disputed the effect of the
April 10, 1992 letter. Telco argued that the letter
created only an expectation of compensation, not
guaranteed employment for a definite term.
Thompson argued that the letter created an employment contract with a definite five-year term. In addition, the parties disputed whether Thompson requested Telco to state "lack of work" as the reason
for his termination.
Thompson testified that he signed the April 10,
1992 agreement approximately one week after he
accepted employment with Telco. He said that he
wanted an employment agreement because he had
been advised by someone who had previously
worked for Telco that "they didn't stand behind
what they said they was going to do.'Thompson described his reasons for entering into the agreement:
*3 The main thing I wanted as far as the 40
hours, I wanted to be sure that I had time available.
If I left my other job to come work for them, I
didn't want them to all of a sudden say, well, we
can only have you here for 20 hours a week. I
wanted to be guaranteed that that 40 would be there
available for me, and some overtime.
Under the terms of the agreement, he received
$1.00 per hour yearly pay raises.
Wass testified that he did not intend for the letter agreement he and Thompson signed to be a fiveyear contract:
Well, what we were trying to do at the time
was establish some type of pay scale for him so
when he came aboard we could try to establish
what his pay rate was going to be and set up some
bonuses and just try to determine where he could be
within any time period, per year, one year up to five
years.
All we were trying to do is set down some
parameters for him to realize his potential and say,
okay, with this company if you are here up to five
years, you could be making "X" amount of dollars
per hour and you could achieve this and beyond this
period, you could go further than that. We just kind
of left the constraint here to kind of give him some
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parameters to adjust for his cost of living, over
time, perhaps, and for him to get an ideal [sic] were
[were] he could be provided everything worked out.
But in no way, shape or form, as the good Lord
as my witness, was there ever any intent here for
this to be guaranteed employment for five years. It
was just a pay scale type thing and that is all it was.
David Burt, Telco's Chief Financial Officer,
testified that none of the other approximately two
hundred seventy Telco employees have any type of
employment contract.
The parties also testified about the application
and enforcement of the employee guidelines. The
Telco Employee Guidelines, signed by Thompson
in January, 1993, provide: "If you clock-in after
8:00 a.m., you do not get a morning break. There
are no exceptions! Anyone not adhering to this
policy will be docked 15 minutes.'Thompson had
several disciplinary action reports indicating that he
arrived late for work, but took a morning break in
violation of the employee guidelines. Thompson
was written up on October 24, 1994, January 31,
1995, August 1, 1995, August 3, 1995, and August
7, 1995. Thompson did not dispute that the reports
were filled out on him, but testified that he had not
seen one of them.
Thompson testified that he routinely arrived
after 8:00 a.m. for work and that, prior to the fall of
1994, Telco management never told him it was necessary to arrive exactly at 8:00. He never received
any admonitions concerning his failure to work
forty hours per week. Thompson testified that he
never refused work; he simply did whatever Wass
brought him to do. He also denied being insubordinate to any manager at Telco.
Thompson testified that he did not believe that
all of the employee guidelines applied to him based
on statements allegedly made by Wass that he
should not worry about certain rules such as break
times or arrival by 8:00 a.m. He admitted that the
parties' letter agreement did not say that the employee guidelines did not apply to him.
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*4 Telco introduced Thompson's personnel file
showing that Thompson consistently worked less
than forty hours per week. Telco also introduced into evidence the employee personnel files for several
other telephone repair technicians showing they
worked considerably more hours than Thompson.
Samuel Price Johnson, the Technician Supervisor at Telco, testified about the change in Telco's
product mix. He also testified that other telephone
repair
technicians
worked
overtime
while
Thompson did not, which created morale problems
with the other workers. Chris Kivalon, the Production Control Manager at Telco, testified that
Thompson's habit of coming in late for work and
nevertheless taking a morning break created morale
problems in his department because he strictly enforced the employee guidelines against the employees in his department.
Wass, Thompson's immediate supervisor, also
testified that the product mix of the company
changed over the years Thompson was employed.
He testified that, although Thompson never refused
work, Thompson indicated that he preferred not to
work on certain products. He denied telling
Thompson that some of the employee guidelines
did not apply to him, but admitted that he did not
write Thompson up for violations of the guidelines
until October, 1994.
Timothy James Burgin, Telco's General Manager, testified that he wrote Thompson up several
times for violations of the employee guidelines.
Burgin testified that, at a meeting about one of the
discipline reports, Thompson told him that, if Telco
was not satisfied with his performance and wanted
to terminate him, the company would have to buy
out the remainder of his contract.
David Burt, Telco's Chief Financial Officer,
testified that, on the day Thompson was fired,
Thompson requested that Telco find a way to get
him unemployment benefits. Burt explained why he
wrote the letter listing "lack of work" as the reason
for Thompson's termination:
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[D]uring the day that Kerry was terminated, he
was requesting that we work out a way so that he
would receive unemployment benefits. We thought
about it and I talked it over with the other members
of management over the next couple of days before
he called us back and, you know, we reviewed the
reasons for why he was terminated and we just kind
of rationalized that there really was a lack of work
and he wasn't giving us a good 40 hours a week and
so forth. And, you know, although I realize now
that wasn't the best decision I have ever made, that
was the decision that we did make and we worded it
that he had been laid off due to lack of work for
that reason.
Wass stated that he was not involved in the decision to state that Thompson was terminated for
"lack of work." He testified that Thompson was terminated for breaking the rules and not being able to
adapt to the changes occurring in the company.
Tim Burgin testified, that at the August 8th termination meeting, Thompson became upset about
the prospect of not having any income. At first, according to Burgin, Thompson demanded his annuity
check and then asked if there was a way to word the
termination letter so that he could receive unemployment compensation benefits. Burgin admitted
that the real reason for Thompson's termination was
insubordination and failure to follow the employee
guidelines. The termination report in Thompson's
personnel file stated that Thompson was terminated
for "Repeated violations of Rules, Disregard for authority, Unsatisfactory performance (amount of out
put for time spent)" and for "violation of contractnot working 40+ hours."
*5 In an a memorandum opinion, the trial court
concluded that the April 10, 1992 letter agreement
was a contract for a five-year term. It found that
"[t]o the extent that there are conflicts between the
testimony of plaintiff and the testimony of Greg
Wass and Tim Burgin, the court credits the testimony of plaintiff.'Tn addition, the trial court found
that Telco had waived its right to rely upon the employee guidelines as a reason for termination, be-
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trial court awarded Thompson $62,235 plus in- terest.
Regarding the unemployment compensation
benefit funds, the trial court ordered:
IT IS FURTHER DECLARED AND DECREED that the fund in the amount of Five Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Four Dollars and 38/100
now held by the Clerk and Master pursuant to prior
orders is hereby escheated to the State of Tennessee
and the clerk is directed to furnish appropriate notice to the State Treasurer in accordance with
T.C.A. §31-6-114.
On appeal, Telco argues that the April 10, 1992
letter agreement was not a contract for a five-year
term of employment, and that it had good cause to
terminate Thompson. Telco argues that the trial
court erred in not dismissing the lawsuit after finding that Thompson had unclean hands. Telco contends it was error for the trial court to sua sponte
strike its defense of accord and satisfaction before
Telco introduced evidence on the defense. Telco asserts that the trial court erred in finding that Telco
waived its right to enforce the employee guidelines.
Telco also argues that the amount of the judgment
was erroneous because it was not supported by the
evidence and because the trial court did not consider Thompson's duty to mitigate damages.
Thompson maintains that the award of damages
should be affirmed, but argues that the trial court
erred in requiring him to reimburse the unemployment compensation benefits he received.
Our review of this case is governed by Rule
13(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides that review of findings of fact
by the trial court shall be de novo upon the record
of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of
correctness, unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. See Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d); Union Carbide
Corp. v. Huddleston,
854 S.W.2d 87, 91
(Tenn. 1993). Findings of law are not entitled to a
presumption of correctness and our review is de
novo. See Rainey v. Stansell, 836 S.W.2d 117, 118
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(Tenn.App.1992).
Telco argues first that the April 10, 1992 letter
agreement was not a contract for a definite term of
employment. Telco does not dispute that the letter
agreement was a valid contract
regarding
Thompson's compensation and other benefits if he
remained employed. Thus, Telco argues that the letter created a guaranteed compensation level if
Thompson remained employed, but not a guarantee
of employment for a specific term.
*6 Thompson argues that the circumstances
show that the parties meant the letter agreement to
be a five-year employment contract, such as
Thompson's testimony that he would not have left
his prior job without a contract. Thompson also
points to statements by Telco employees that
Thompson had a contract, such as Burgin's statement in Thompson's termination meeting that working less than forty hours a week was a breach of his
employment contract, as well as the termination report stating that Thompson violated the contract by
not working forty hours a week.
Tennessee has long adhered to the doctrine of
employment at will. See Bennett v. Sterner-Liff Iron
& Metal Co., 826 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tenn.1992).
Under the employment at will doctrine, in the absence of a clear contractual agreement, either party
in the employment relationship may terminate the
relationship at any time, with or without cause. See
/"df."[T]here is a presumption that an employee is an
employee at will. This presumption must be overcome by specific language guaranteeing a definite
term of employment."Davis v Connecticut Gen
Life
Ins.
Co.,
743
F.Supp.
1273,
1280
(M.D.Tenn.1990). Employment for an indefinite
term is employment at will.Nelson Trabue, Inc. v.
Professional Management-Automotive,
Inc., 589
S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tenn. 1979); Hooks v. Gibson,
842 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Tenn.App.1992).
Telco cites Loeffler v. Kjellgren, 884 S.W.2d
463 (Tenn.App.1994), in support of its argument
that the letter agreement was not a five-year con-
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tract. In Loeffler, an employee sued his former employer for breach of contract, based on a letter that
the employee asserted was a contract. During the
employment negotiations, the employer sent the
employee the following letter:
This letter will confirm my interest in employing your services to establish and run a plastic company (splash guards).
As you requested, I have outlined your expectations for compensation:
1) First year salary $45,000.00
2) Second year salary $50,000.00
3) Participation in group insurance plan
provided by Fleetline.
4) Reimbursement for relocation to Tennessee
5) After working for four (4) years, you will be
provided a $25,000.00 per year for four (4) years
for consulting fees.
Thanking you, in advance, and hoping to hear
from you in the very near future, I remain,
Yours very truly,
Fred M. Kjellgren
President
Id. at 466.The trial court directed a verdict on
the breach of contract claim, finding that the letter
did not constitute an offer. See id. at 467.The appellate court found no material evidence to support the
employee's claim that the letter was a contract. See
id. at 468.The appellate court stated that "[t]he letter merely confirms defendants' 'interest' in employing plaintiffs services and outlines, per
plaintiffs request, plaintiffs 'expectations for compensation.' The letter does not offer the plaintiff a
contract of employment for an eight year term."/<i.
The court noted that, in order to overcome the presumption in Tennessee that employment is terminable at will, "the employer must use specific language which guarantees employment for a definite
term."A/. The Loeffler court concluded that the
letter "simply set forth what plaintiff c ould e xpect to earn by way of compensation if he continued to work for Fleetline; there is no guarantee of employment for a definite term."M
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*7 Telco also cites Brock v Provident Life and
Accident
Insurance
Co.,
No.
03A01-9509-CV-00297,
1996
WL
134943
(Tenn.App. Mar.27, 1996). In Brock, when all of
the plaintiff employees were originally hired, they
signed documents explaining that their employment
was at-will. See id. at — l . T h e employees argued,
however, that a subsequent letter accepting them into a special project unit within the company created
an employment contract for a specific term. See id.
at -—2.The subsequent letter read, "This project assignment period is between 2 1/2 to 3 years."Id.
The trial court concluded that the letter did not
change the employees' status from at-will employment, and this was affirmed on appeal. See id at —4-5.Relying on Loeffler, this Court found no language guaranteeing employment or stating a specific term for employment. See id. at —4.The Court
also noted that other language in the second letter
stated that it was not a contractual agreement. See id.
Thompson distinguishes Loeffler by noting that
the letter in Loeffler merely indicated an interest in
hiring the employee, while the letter in this case
was an agreement reflecting the intent of the
parties. In this case, it is undisputed that the letter
agreement was an employment contract; the dispute
is whether the parties intended the terms of the contract to include employment for a definite term of
five years. The only language in the letter that is arguable is the provision that Thompson "will be
guaranteed a minimum $1.00 per hour raise per
year over the next five (5) years."Clearly the import
of this statement is to convey the level at which
Thompson would be compensated, not the length of
time he would be employed. Under Tennessee caselaw, the reference to five years is not sufficiently
specific to create a contract for a definite term of
employment. See Davis v. Connecticut Gen Life
Ins. Co., 743 F. Spp.. 1273, 1280 (M.D.Tenn.1990);
Brock v Provident Life and Accident Ins Co, No
03A01-9509-CV-00297, 1996 WL 134943, at -—4
(Tenn.App. Mar.27, 1996); Loeffler v. Kjellgren,
884 S.W.2d 463, 468 (Tenn.App. 1994). Moreover,
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the testimony of the parties does not indicate that
the parties intended to create an agreement for employment for a definite term Wass, the person who
signed the letter agreement on behalf of Telco, testified that he had no intent to create a contract for
employment for a five-year term Thompson testified that, at the time he signed the letter agreement,
his concern was that he would be guaranteed forty
hours per week, so that his hours could not be reduced to part-time Even Thompson did not testify
that he intended to create a contract of employment
for a definite five-year term Under all of these circumstances, we must conclude that the evidence
preponderates against the trial court's finding that
the letter agreement constituted an agreement of
employment for a definite five-year
term
Thompson was an employee at will, and his termination did not breach the agreement between the
parties Therefore, the trial court's award of damages to Thompson in the amount of $62,235 must
be reversed
*8 This holding pretermits the other issues
raised by Telco on appeal
Thompson argues on appeal that the trial court
erred in ordering him to pay into court the monies
he received as unemployment compensation benefits and then decreeing that the monies escheated to
the State The trial court's order instructing
Thompson to refund the monies did not find that
the parties fraudulently entered into the termination
letter in an effort to defraud the State, but stated
that "a violation of T C A § 50-7-709 may have occurred "After the Tennessee Department of Employment Security refused to accept the funds from
Thompson, the trial court granted Thompson peimission to pay the funds to the clerk of the court
When the trial court decreed that the funds escheated to the State, it ordered the clerk to furnish
appropriate notice to the State Treasurer in accordance
with
Tennessee
Code
Annotated
§
31-6-114 FN2
FN2 This section, involving the joinder of
the treasurer, reads
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(a) In any case in any court of this state involving the title to any property, including but not
limited to proceedings involving the validity or
construction of wills, where it shall appear that
such property may be subject to escheat under this
chapter, the state treasurer shall be made a party defendant therein, either in the original pleadings, on
motion of any party, on petition of the treasurer, or
by the court on its own motion Process shall be
served on the treasurer as otherwise provided by
law, and after making such investigation as he
deems appropriate, he shall, through the attorney
general, file such pleadings and take such position
as may be determined to best protect the interest of
the state
(b) In any such case, if the court decrees that
the property has escheated to this state under this
chapter, then no further proceeding shall be necessary to establish the state's right thereto and such
property shall be disposed of by the tieasurer as
herein provided for other property escheating to the
state
Tenn Code Ann §31-6-114(1984)
We must conclude that the trial court implicitly
found that the parties had entered into an agreement
to defraud the State, based on the parties' testimony
that Thompson was not terminated for 'lack of
work " However, even if "lack of work" was not
the true reason for Thompson's termination, there
was no finding by the trial court that Thompson
was terminated for a reason that would disqualify
him from receiving unemployment benefits Unless
Thompson would not have received unemployment
compensation benefits but for the statement that he
was terminated for "lack of work," there can be no
finding that he fraudulently received the benefits
From the record, it appears that the reasons for
Thompson's discharge were excessive tardiness re
peated violation of the company rule against taking
a break when an employee is tardy, and unsatisfactory job performance by failing to adapt to changes
in the company and failure to work sufficient hours
The disqualifications for receiving unemploy-
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ment compensation benefits include among other
reasons,
"misconduct
connected
with
[the]
claimant's work "Tenn Code Ann § 50-7-303
(Supp 1998) The burden of proving disqualification for benefits is on the employer Simmons v
Culpepper, 937 S W 2 d 938, 945 (Tenn App 1996)
Under some circumstances, actions such as excessive tardmess, repeated violations of company rules
and failure to work sufficient hours may amount to
"misconduct" under the statute if "the whole of the
facts reveal that [the] actions exhibit a wanton,
careless, and negligent disregard for the interest o f
the employer Id
In this case, however, Thompson's actions,
while warranting discharge, do not amount to the
type of misconduct that would disqualify him from
receiving unemployment compensation benefits
Consequently, since Thompson would not have
been disqualified from receiving unemployment
compensation benefits even if he had not been given the letter stating that he was terminated for "lack
of work," there can be no finding that he fraudulently received the benefits On this basis, we conclude that the trial court erred in requiring
Thompson to pay the monies into court and then ordering the funds escheated to the State We do not
reach the issue of whether the trial court had authority sua sponte to take these actions regarding
the unemployment compensation benefits Since the
State is not a party to this appeal we do not order
the State to repay the funds to Thompson, however,
nothing in this Opinion precludes Thompson from
filing an action against the State to recover the
monies All other issues raised on appeal are pretermitted
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unemployment compensation benefits be escheated
to the State
The decision of the trial court is reversed and
the cause is remanded for further proceedings con
sistent with this Opinion Costs are taxed to Ap
pellee, for which execution may issue if necessary
CANTRELL and KOCH, JR , JJ , concur
Tenn App, 1999
Thompson v Telco, Inc
Not Reported in S W 2 d , 1999 WL
(Tenn Ct App)

548610

END OF DOCUMENT

*9 In sum, we find that the letter agreement
lacks language expressly guaranteeing a definite
term of employment, and that consequently
Thompson was an employee at will Therefore, the
trial court's award of damages for breach of contract is reversed In addition, the trial court erred in
ordering Thompson to pay into court the unemployment compensation benefits and in ordering that the

© 2008 Thomson/West No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works

https //web2 westlaw coiWpnnt/pnntstream aspx^prft^HTMLE&destination^atp&sv^Split

2/29/2008

V\fctlaw.
Not Reported in P.2d
Not Reported in P.2d, 1998 WL 1769732 (Utah Dist.Ct.), 17 IER Cases 504
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.2d)

C
Walker v. Micron Technology, Inc.
Utah Dist.Ct, 1998.
Patricia D. WALKER, Shauna Smoot, Marilyn A.
Walsh, and Sherd Talbot, Plaintiff,
v.
MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC., Defendants.
No. 960400324.
May 13, 1998.
Lois A. Baar (3761), David W. Zimmerman (5567),
Parsons Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake City, Utah, for
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
MAETANI, J.
*1 This matter came before the Honorable
Howard H. Maetani, Fourth District Court Judge,
on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed on December 8, 1997, and Plaintiffs Opposition and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed April 8, 1998. Defendant filed a Reply on
April 17, 1998, and oral arguments were heard on
April 21, 1998. The Court took the matter under advisement.
Having reviewed the file, considered the
memoranda of counsel, heard oral arguments, and
being fully advised in the premises, the Court issues the following:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

I

Page 1

production plant.
2. Based on market conditions in late 1994 and
early 1995, Micron developed plans to increase its
production capacity. In July 1995, Micron began
construction of a new plant in Lehi, Utah, anticipating that it would begin production in July 1996.
3. Around the time construction began on the
Lehi plant, Micron asked David Cheffings, Pat
Otte, Dennis Varie and Brad Mabe to move to Utah
and become the Fabrication Manager, Production
Manager, Shift Manager and Personnel Manager,
respectively, at the new facility.
4. In October and November 1995, Messrs.
Cheggings, Otte, Blackburn, Mabe and other Micron managers began interviewing candidates-including plaintiffs-for positions as "operators'1
(individuals who perform production labor) in the
production area known as the "Fab area." Micro n
wanted to hire 25 operators in its first round of interviews. Micron anticipated that it would eventually employ 1,500 operators at the Lehi plant within
five years after the July 1996 start-up.
5. Micron conducted interviews with operator
candidates at the Provo office of Utah Job Service.
Micron began each round of interviews with general orientation sessions with approximately 10-20
candidates per session. After a general orientation,
each candidate, including each of the plaintiffs,
completed an employment application which stated:
I understand and agree that, if hired, my employment will be for no definite period, and it can
be terminated with or without cause, and with or
without notice, at any time at the option of either
[Micron] or myself. I understand further that the
terms of my employment may be changed at any
time at the discretion of company management.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Each of the plaintiffs, with the exception of
Ms. Walsh, signed on the line below this paragraph.
1. Micron manufactures dynamic random-access-memory microchips at its manufacturing plant
in Boise, Idaho. This is Micron's only operating
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tion, each of the plaintiffs and the other job candidates participated in a series of individual interviews
with different Micron managers including Messrs.
Cheffings, Otte, Blackburn, Mabe and others. During these interviews, the Micron managers told
each of the plaintiffs that Micron was hiring "key
people" to take to Boise to "train as supervisors" or,
"train to advance to positions as supervisors" for
the Lehi plant. When asked, they informed the
plaintiffs that an operator is paid $6.75 per hour, a
trainer is paid $7.75 per hour and a supervisor receives a salary of $31,000 per year.
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tion schedule. At that time, Micron anticipated that
the change in schedule would move completion of
the Lehi Plant back so that operation would begin
in approximately December 1996, as opposed to July 1996, as originally planned.
11. Shortly before or after the plaintiffs arrived
in Boise for training, Micron informed each of them
that delay in completion of the Lehi Plant would
extend their training to twelve months.

9. During the Summer and Fall of 1995, while
construction of the Lehi Plant was in its early
phases, market conditions remained relatively
strong. However, in November and December of
1995, market conditions, including specifically the
average selling prices for microchips, began to deteriorate.

12. During orientation, each of the plaintiffs received certain materials and was asked to complete
certain forms. Among the materials distributed,
each plaintiff received a Micron employee handbook entitled "Team Member Handbook." Each
plaintiff acknowledged receipt of the handbook and
agreed to read it. The first page of the handbook
contains the following statement:
[Micron] has prepared this handbook to
provide team members (Employees) with an overview of [Micron's] policies, benefits, And rules.
This handbook is not a contract, and is not to be
construed as being one. Compliance with the handbook's terms is not a guarantee of continued employment with Micron. All team members are employees at will, which means that their employment
with Micron may be terminated by either the employee or [Micron], at any time, with or without
cause or advance notice....
General Standards of Conduct
Team members should understand that their
employment is "at will," which means that their
employment can be terminated at any time by either
the team member or [Micron] and with or without
cause, notice or eligibility for rehire. Micron team
members are not subject to any probationary period
nor are they entitled to an expectation of continued
employment. Therefore, team members should recognize that conduct in addition to that listed below, may also result in disciplinary action or termination.

10. Micron decided during the last week of
December of 1995 to change the construction site
for the Lehi Plant to a more "normalized" construc-

*3 The Team Member Handbook subsequently
lists and describes examples of activities and actions for which an employee may be terminated, in-

*2 7. Micron also told plaintiffs and other operator candidates that Micron would require them to
participate in an expedited training program at its
Boise, Idaho manufacturing plant (the "Boise
Plant") for six to nine months. Operators trained at
the Boise Plant would receive temporary relocation
benefits.
8. In late November and early December 1995,
Micron offered each of the plaintiffs (and 21 others) a position as an operator at the Lehi Plant and
Micron asked each of the plaintiffs to begin training
at Micron's Boise Plant in January 1996. The
plaintiffs accepted. Micron provided each plaintiff
with relocation benefits which included temporary
housing (an apartment or stipend equivalent), travel
expenses to and from Boise, and a monthly stipend
for incidental expenses. Micron informed each
plaintiff that she would be required to repay these
temporary relocation expenses if he or she quit
within the first 12 months of her employment.
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eluding inadequate job performance, tardiness and
absenteeism, insubordination and disruptive conduct, harassment, health and safety violations, and
unethical behavior The Team member Handbook
further states that it is not possible to anticipate all
of the possible reasons for termination and reserves
the right to terminate employees for any other reason
13 The plaintiffs were traming at Micron's
Boise Plant during February 1996 At that time, the
average selling price of microchips continued to decline Because the decline continued for a significant period, Micron's management became increasingly convinced that the decline represented a longterm market trend and that there was no longer demand sufficient to justify expansion of the Boise
Plant or completion of the Lehi Plant As a result,
on February 26, 1997, Micron delayed completion
of the planned expansion of the Boise Plant and
construction of the Lehi Plant
14 After Micron announced that it would indefinitely delay completion of the Lehi Plant, Micron offered each of the plaintiffs and the other operators training in Boise (a) a position as an operator at the Boise Plant at the same wage rate, with
significant relocation benefits, or (b) two months'
severance pay Micron also informed each of the
plaintiffs that it would not request that she repay relocation expenses Micron previously paid if she decided to not accept employment with Micron in
Boise
15 Each of the Plaintiffs declined Micron's offer of continued employment in Boise Each of the
plaintiffs, except Ms Walker (a) filled out and
signed a Resignation/Discharge Request form stating that she resigned because of the Lehi slowdown, and (b) accepted severance equal to two
months' pay
16 May 17, 1996, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint
alleging Breach of Contract, Promissory Estoppel,
Negligent Misrepresentation, Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Breach of Implied Covenant of Good
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Faith and Fair Dealing, and Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress
17 July 14, 1996, Defendant filed an Answer
denying Plaintiffs' allegations
18 December 8, 1997, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
19 April 8, 1998, Plaintiff filed an Opposition
and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
20 April 17, 1998, Defendant filed a Reply
21 April 21, 1998, the Court heard oral argu
ments and took the matter under advisement

II

STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
56(a) and (b), a party against whom a claim has
been made, may at any time move for a summary
judgment in his favor The motion should be granted if " the pleadings, depositions, answers to in
terrogatones, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law "URCP Rule 56C

III

ISSUES

*4 Plaintiffs argue that they entered into a
three-year employment contract with Micron and
that it breached the contract by failing to employ
the plaintiffs at the Lehi, Utah Plant Defendant argues that Plaintiffs were at will employees and that
they were offered employment at the Boise Plant
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when the Lehi Plant construction ceased due to an
economic downturn in the price of microchips.

IV

ANALYSIS

A. The plaintiffs were "at will" employees of Micron

There is a presumption that an employment relationship which does not have a specified duration
is "at will" and may be terminated at any time by
either employee or employer. In order to rebut this
presumption the burden falls on the party claiming
that there was an express or implied contract to terminate only for cause.
In Evans v. GTE Health Systems, Inc., the Utah
Court of Appeals held that "general expressions of
long-term employment or job advancement do not
convert an at-will employment contract to a termination only for cause contract."857 P.2d 974
(Ct.App.1993), quoting Vancheri v. GNLV Corp.,
Ill P.2d 366 (Nev.1989). In that case, the plaintiff
resigned from previous employment to relocate to
Florida. The Defendant agreed that it would not terminate the plaintiff during the first twelve to eighteen months of employment for failure to sell
enough systems. The company made no promise
not to terminate based on any other reason. It only
made a general expression of long-term employment and agreed not to fire the plaintiff based
solely on his sales record. In addition, the Court
made this decision knowing that the plaintiff had
sold his home, relocated to Florida to begin training
and declined another job offer, the plaintiffs wife
closed her preschool and referred students to other
schools. The Court knew that the plaintiff had made
significant relocation decisions and still ruled that
the plaintiff was an "at will" employee.
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may have in fact made significant arrangements to
relocate to Boise for one year. In light of the
Court's decision in Evans it is immaterial in the determination of the plaintiffs' status as employees.
The agreement between the plaintiffs and Micron
did not contain a specific duration of employment.
It was a general expression of long-term employment, which according to the Court in Evans does
not convert an "at-will" status into an employment
contract for cause. The plaintiffs were to train for
one year in Boise and then return as supervisors for
an undetermined length of time at the Lehi Plant.
Plaintiffs' counsel claims that the plaintiff in Evans
was not "facing the extensive, pressure filled background circumstances of the instant case."See
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support
of Their Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, p 6
Plaintiffs counsel fails to recognize, or chooses to
ignore, that the plaintiff in Evans didn't plan to
move to Florida for one year, but permanently. He
sold his home, his wife closed her business and
when the plaintiff was fired due to economic downturn, he was not offered comparable employment at
another location. In the present case, the plaintiffs
were asked to relocate for one year and when the
Lehi Plant was delayed due to economic downturn
they were not tired. Rather, the plaintiffs were
offered comparable employment at the Boise Plant,
the only Micron Plant in operation. The plaintiff in
Evans was in a worse position than the plaintiffs in
the present case. Even if the plaintiffs had been in a
worse position it still wouldn't matter. The Court in
Evans did not consider the hardship placed on the
plaintiff in determining his status as an "at-will"
employee.
*5 Plaintiffs have the burden of rebutting the
presumption of "at-will" employment. They must
prove that there was an intent on the Defendant's
part to create an implied contract. Intent can be
demonstrated in employment manuals, oral agreements and circumstances demonstrating an intent
only to terminate for cause. However, the Utah
Court of Appeals held in Trembly v Mrs Fields

In the present case, the plaintiffs allege and
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Cookies, that where an employee handbook expressly changes the condition of an employee's employment, the modified conditions become part of
the employment contract if the employee knew that
a handbook was distributed. 884 P.2d 1306, 1312
(1994). In the present case, Micron expressly stated
in several locations that the positions would be
"at-will" employment. The plaintiffs filled out Micron's employment application and received a Micron Team Member Handbook, both of which
placed language prominently on the first page indicating that the employment would be "at-will."
The application stated, "I understand and agree
that, if hired, my employment will be for no definite period, and it can be terminated with or without
cause, and with or without notice, at any time at the
option of either [Micron] or myself'The Micron
Team Member Handbook stated:
This handbook is not a contract, and is not to
be construed as being one. Compliance with the
handbook's terms is not a guarantee of continued
employment with Micron. All team members are
employees at will, which means that their employment with [Micron] may be terminated by either the
employee or [Micron], at any time, with or without
cause or advance notice.
In addition to these prominently placed disclaimers, the Handbook reiterates that the employment is "at-will" under the heading, "General
Standards of Conduct." In Kir berg v. West One
Bank, the Utah Court of Appeals held that where an
employee signed an employment application and
had access to an employee handbook, both of which
contained express disclaimers, the employment relationship was determined to be "at-will." 872 P.2d
39 (Utah Ct.App.1994). In order to rebut the
"at-will" presumption and statements contained in
these documents, the plaintiffs must offer evidence
that Micron intended to change the "at-will" employment. In Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, the Utah
Supreme Court held that an implied-in-fact contract
term may be found only where the employer's alleged promise meets the requirements of an offer of
a unilateral contract. 818 P.2d 997 (1991). The Su-
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preme Court also explains its decision in Berube v.
Fashion Centre, Ltd., which the plaintiff cites to
support the argument that plaintiffs status was
altered from "at-will" employment. 771 P.2d 1033
(Utah 1989). However, the plaintiffs failed to address that the Supreme Court explained its decision
in Berube in Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818
P.2d 997 (Utah 1991). The Court said in footnote 9
of Johnson, that an "employee manual can rebut the
presumption of at-will employment by showing the
existence of an implied-in-fact contract term
providing that the employment is not at will."The
Court went on to say that at-will employment may
be rebutted by an implied contract term. However,
in the present case, the handbook clearly states in
more than one place, that the plaintiffs employment
was at-will; nor does the handbook contain any
terms that can be offered to even suggest an implied
contract term. Therefore, an implied contract was
not created through statements in the handbook.
*6 Alternatively, Plaintiffs allege that Micron
made a promise creating an implied contract
through its agents during the initial interviewing
process. Plaintiffs claim that job service interviewers indicated that Micron was hiring for
"long-term" employment and was looking for the
"cream of the crop" to work as trainers and supervisors in the Lehi Plant. Plaintiffs also argue that
because they were required to relocate for one year
to train in Boise and would be liable for relocation
costs if they quit during the training, that this condition created an implied contract. However, the
Court held in Evans, as previously discussed, that a
general expression of long-term employment is not
sufficient to create an employment contract. The
fact that plaintiffs would have to pay back the relocation money paid to them if they quit early does
not indicate an intent or promise on Micron's part.
It simply is a matter of reimbursement of funds.
Even if an implied agreement had been created by
these interviewers, the express "at-will" disclaimers
distributed in the application and employee handbook would supersede and modify any agreements,
thus rendering the employment "at-will." Trembly
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v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah
Ct.App.1994). Micron did not create an implied
contract nor did it make any promises not to terminate the plaintiffs.

B. Micron Did Not Breach Any Promise to Plaintiffs
Micron did not breach any promise to plaintiffs
nor did it terminate plaintiffs' employment. Micron
could not offer employment in the Lehi Plant, after
the year of training in Boise, because the plant's
construction and use was postponed due to economic downturn in the price of microchips. Plaintiffs'
breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims
rely on the creation of an implied employment contract to terminate only for cause and its subsequent
breach. For the reasons previously discussed there
was no employment contract making the employees
"at-wiir and consequently there could be no breach
for termination. Either party can terminate an
"at-will" relationship at any time and for any reason.
However, not only were the employees
"at-will", but Micron did not terminate their employment by offering them work at the Boise Plant.
The Lehi Plant did not open as scheduled due to the
declining microchip market. As a result, Micron
offered the plaintiffs employment in the only operating Micron Plant in Boise when their training was
complete. In addition, Micron offered each of the
plaintiffs a substantial relocation package to move
to Boise, including moving expenses, two months
temporary housing and storage, $300 towards round
trip expenses, 36 hours of time off with pay for relocation purposes, $1,000 for incidental expenses,
home sale or lease cancellation assistance (up to
$18,000 in Realtor fees or $2,500, respectively).
Each of the plaintiffs, except Ms. Walker, declined
Micron's offer and signed a Resignation/Discharge
Request Form stating the "Lehi Slow Down" w as
the reason for resignation and accepted two months
severance pay. In Fins tad v. Montana P ower Co.,
the Montana Supreme Court held that an employee
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was not actually or constructively terminated when
he refused to relocate to a new office in another city
where all supervisory staff was being placed. 785
P.2d 1372 (1990). The plaintiffs chose to resign
rather than relocate to Boise where the only operating Micron plant was located. Micron did not terminate the plaintiffs
employment,
therefore
plaintiffs' breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims fail.
*7 Even if this Court assumed that an implied
contract had been created and that Micron terminated the Plaintiffs, their claims would still fail because delay in completion of the Lehi Plant constitutes good cause for termination. While Utah
Courts have not issued a case on point, there is a
Sixth Circuit case that addresses this issue. In
Boyton v. TRW, Inc., the court held an employee
does not have a cause of action for wrongful termination when the employee was laid off due to adverse economic factors beyond the employer's control. 858 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir.l986)"To hold otherwise would impose an unworkable burden on employers to stay in business to the point of bankruptcy in order to satisfy employment contracts
....terminable only for good or sufficient cause."Id.
The Court rejected the employee's claim that a just
cause employment contract guarantees employment
regardless of changes in economic conditions. Id. at
1184.
In the present case, Micron delayed completion
of the Lehi Plant due to unanticipated market conditions surrounding the fall of microchip prices.
Micron's decisions concerning product on have
been based mainly on market conditions. They include worldwide market supply and demand for microchip products, and Micron's operations, cash
flow, and alternative use of capital. Based on market conditions in late 1994 and early 1995, Micron
developed plans to increase its production capacity.
Micron expanded its Boise Plant and began accelerated construction of a DRAM microchip manufacturing plant in Lehi, Utah. However, in November
and December of 1995, the selling price of micro-
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chips began to fall. As a result of this decline, Micron moved the construction schedule for the Lehi
Plant to a more normalized construction schedule
during the last week of December 1995. When the
decline in prices continued, Micron believed that
the decline represented a long-term market trend
and that there was no longer demand sufficient to
justify expansion of the Boise Plant or completion
of the Lehi Plant. On February 26, 1997, Micron
delayed completion of the expansion of the Boise
Plant and construction of the Lehi Plant. These
events were based on market conditions and constituted good cause to terminate plaintiffs. Even if Micron could not terminate plaintiffs except for cause
and even if Micron had terminated plaintiffs their
claims would still fail because the sustained decline
of microchips selling price constitutes good cause
for termination. Myrold v. NCR Corp., 3 IER Cases
1009, 1012 (S.D.Cal. 1988).

C. Plaintiffs' Negligent and Fraudient Misrepresentation Claims Fail Because there is No Evidence
to Support them
Plaintiffs fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claims are based on the same alleged representations made by the job service interviewers
that plaintiffs argued created an implied employment contract. The two representations are basically
that the plaintiffs would be employed in Utah after
training in Boise for six to nine months, and that
they would have a chance to receive promotions to
trainer or supervisor positions at the Lehi Plant.
Since these alleged representations were not sufficient to rebut the "at-will" presumption, plaintiffs
are simply trying to take another bite at the apple
by arguing fraud. When the plaintiffs were hired,
prior to the economic decline of microchip prices,
Micron anticipated opening the Lehi Plant and
staffing it with the plaintiffs and other employees.
In addition, if the Lehi Plant had been in operation
when the plaintiffs completed their training they
would have been eligible to act as trainers or supervisors to the other employees hired to work in the
Lehi Plant who weren't required to train in Boise.
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Plaintiffs are trying to avoid the ramifications of
being "at-will" employees.
*8 Defendant argued accurately in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement that a contract claim may not be pled as a
fraud action in order to circumvent the unavailability of a contract remedy for a job termination.
Locke v. Hamilton Digital Controls, Inc., 8 ICR
Cases (BNA) 1201 (S.D.Cal. 1993) (fraudulent misrepresentation claims based on assurances of job security rejected as "creative avenues around the atwill employment doctrine"); Stephens v. The Clipper Inc., 7 ICR Cases (BNA) 727 (N.D.Tex. 1992),
affd,914 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir.1992) (fraud action
will not be recognized in addition to contract action
where the fraud action seeks to enforce contractual
rights). In addition, the Defendant points out that
the Utah Supreme Court previously addressed this
issue in McKinnon v. Corporation of the President
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
529 P.2d 434 (Utah 1974). The Utah Supreme
Court held that "fraud, generally, cannot be predicated upon the failure to perform a promise or contract which is unenforceable .... for the promisor
has not, in a legal sense, made a contract; and therefore, he has the right, both in law and equity, to refuse to perform."Id. At 436. Micron did not create
an employment contract with Plaintiffs. They were
at-will employees and therefore cannot argue fraudulent misrepresentations to create contract implications when no contract ever existed. Plaintiffs cannot avoid the at-will status by raising fraudulent
misrepresentation claims.
In addition, Plaintiffs' claims of fraudulent misrepresentation fail because they've failed to meet
the burden of proof. Fraudulent misrepresentation
requires a showing of an existing material fact,
made knowingly or recklessly for the purpose of inducing reliance thereon upon which plaintiff relies
to his detriment. Sugarhouse Finance Co. V. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980); Maack v.
Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 584
(Utah Ct.App.1994). Plaintiffs have also failed to
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prove negligent misrepresentation which requires a
showing that false representations regarding facts
were made without using reasonable diligence or
competence in assessing the truth of the representations. DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d
1000, 1008 (Utah Ct.App.1992); Cerritos Trucking
Co. V. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 612
(Utah 1982). Fraudulent misrepresentation is based
on presently existing facts, not future promises. Republic Group Inc. V. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d
285, 292 (Utah CtApp.1994); Medesco & Faulkner
v. LNS International, Inc., 762 F.Supp. 920 (1991).
Plaintiffs argue that the general expressions of
long-term employment after training in Boise were
fraudulent misrepresentations. This argument fails
for two reasons. First, these representations regard
future events and fraudulent misrepresentations
must concern presently existing facts. Second, the
statements made during the interviews with the
plaintiffs demonstrate that at the time, Micron anticipated the Lehi Plant to open as originally scheduled. Micron made general representations of longterm employment at the Lehi Plant because the economic decline in Microchips was not foreseeable at
that time. Micron interviewers had no idea the Lehi
Plant would be delayed nor did they have any reason to believe the representations made to plaintiffs
were false. Plaintiffs were among the first group of
operators to begin training for the Fab Area in the
Lehi Plant where Micron planned to eventually employ approximately 1500 operators. As the first
group hired, they would be given the opportunity to
fill the training and supervisory positions if the
Lehi Plant had opened on schedule, as was anticipated at the time of the interviews. Plaintiffs fail to
offer any facts indicating that any of the micron
managers believed these facts to be false or had any
reason to believe they were untrue at the time they
were made. Therefore, plaintiffs claims for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation fail.

D. Plaintiffs' Claim for Breach of Implied Covenant
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Page 8

Berube v. Fashion Centre. 771 P.2d 1033, 1046
(Utah 1989). However, Plaintiffs' fail to address the
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Sanderson v.
First Sec. Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992).
While the Court does note that it is within the fact
finders responsibility to determine if an impliedin-fact contract exists, the Court also states that
"the court retains the power to decide whether as a
matter of law, a reasonable jury could find that an
implied contract exists."A/ . At 306, citing Brehany
v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah 1991);
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033,
1052 (Utah 1989). In addition, the Court goes on to
address the implied-in-law covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Prior to 1992, the Court considered arguments for implied covenants and ruled
against them. "Three times in the past three years,
we have refused to recognize an implied-in-law
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that creates
a for-cause standard for dismissal."/^. At 308. The
Court goes on to explain that while good faith is always part of a contract, it "cannot be construed
....to establish new, independent rights or duties not
agreed upon by the parties.'7c/ At 308, citing
Brehany at 55.
The Court again upholds its position in Walker
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 844 P.2d 335 (Utah
App.1992). The Court cites its decision in Brehany
and quotes from its previous decision:
[I]n the absence of empress terms limiting the
right of an employer to discharge for any or no
reason and in the absence of provisions establishing
procedures by which a discharge should be effectuated it would be inconsistent to hold that an employer, on the basis of the implied covenant of good
faith, is bound to a substantive limitation on the
employer's right to discharge./^, at 55.
Clearly the Court is maintaining the position
that an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing cannot be used to circumvent employee's
at-will status. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims for
breach fails as they were at-will employees, as previously discussed, and Micron did not terminate

*9 Plaintiffs base their entire argument on
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them, nor did it act in bad faith by offering comparable employment in its only operational plant, in
Boise

E Plaintiffs' Negligent Infliction of Emtional Distress Claims Fail
The Utah Worker's Compensation Act bars a
claim against an employer which requires proof of
mental and/or physical injuries as an indispensable
part of the claim The Act provides, in relevant part
The right to recover compensation pursuant to
this chapter for injuries sustained
shall be the exclusive remedy against any
employer and the liabilities of the employer imposed by this chapter
shall be in place of any and all other civil liability
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise,
on account of any accident or injury or death, in any way
contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred by
such employee in the course of or because of or
arising out of the employee's employment and no
action at law may be maintained against an employer
based upon any accident, injury or death of an
employee
*10 Utah Code Ann § 34A-2-105 Under Utah
law, mental injury is a necessary element of a claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress Mounteerv
Utah Power & Light Co, 823 P 2d 1055,
1056-59 (Utah 1991), Retherford v A T & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc, 844 P 2d 949,
964-65 (Utah 1992) As a result, claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress are barred by
the Act It follows that plaintiffs claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress are barred by
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act
Even if The Workers' Compensation Act
doesn't bar the Plaintiffs' claims, their claims are insufficient to support claims of Emotional Distress
In Hansen v Mountain Fuel Supply Co, 858 P 2d
970 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court explained the degree of emtional distress necessary to
sustain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional

© 2008 Thomson/West No
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distress The Court stated
We emphasize
that the emotional distress
suffered must be severe, it must be such that "a
reasonable (person) normally constituted, would be
unable to adequately cope with the mental stress
engendered by the circumstances of the case
Id quoting Rodriguez v State, 472 P 2d 509,
520 (1970) The Court in Hansen dismissed the
plaintiffs' claims because the injuries suffered were
"transitory anxiety and sleeplessness" and not the
kind of severe emotion disturbance that would constitute a mental illness The Court indicated that insomnia and "anxiety do not amount to the type of
emtional distress with which a reasonable person,
normally constituted, would be unable to cope "Id
In the present case the Plaintiffs' injuries do not
constitute severe distress that would result in a
mental illness But even if they did the Plaintiffs'
claims would still fail because they did not result
from termination In Hamilton v Parkdale Care
Center, Inc the Court holds that employees who
suffer mental injury because of the manner in
which termination is effected are limited to the
worker's compensation remedies 904 P 2d 1110
(Utah App 1995) In this case, as previously discussed, the Plaintiffs' were not terminated by Micron They chose to decline positions at the Boise
Plant and move back to Utah Plaintiffs' cannot
claim injury due to termination when they were not
terminated Even if the Plaintiffs' had been terminated their injuries do not meet the level of severe
emtional distress Plaintiff Walker complains of ulcers and depression which can be attributed to her
broken engagement with her fiance She also admits
that she suffered from ulcers for a few years prior
to training at the Boise Plant Plaintiff Smoot
claims she's experienced hardship and challenges in
settling down back in Utah after returning from
Boise She indicates that she's "a little weepy"
Plaintiff Talbot complains of headaches, insomnia
and a clenched or popping jaw She admits this is a
prior condition and that her marriage troubles improved since returning from Boise Plaintiff Walsh
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complains of stress caused by separation from her
family while in Boise.
*11 Plaintiffs' claimed injuries do not rise to
the level of severe emotional distress constituting a
mental illness. The "injuries" resulted from normal
levels of stress experienced in average every day
life. The Plaintiffs' injuries are insufficient to sustain a cause of action for infliction of emtional distress.
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I hereby certify that on this 18 day of May,
1998, I caused to be mailed, via first class mail, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
AND JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE to:
Gordon Duval
Duval, Hansen, Witt & Morley
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Utah Dist.Ct., 1998.
Walker v. Micron Technology, Inc.
Not Reported in P.2d, 1998 WL 1769732 (Utah
DistCt.), 17 IER Cases 504

V
DECISION

END OF DOCUMENT

The Court finds that the plaintiffs were "at
will" employees of Micron. In addition, Micron did
not terminate plaintiffs' employment, rather offered
employment at the only existing plant, in Boise.
Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court DENIES Plaintiffs Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment.
Counsel for Defendant Micron is instructed to
prepare an Order consistent with this Decision.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE
For the reasons set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision filed on May 13, 1998, defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED and plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED. The plaintiffs' Complaint
and all the claims for relief asserted therein are dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. Defendant
is hereby awarded its costs and is instructed to prepare a bill of costs in accordance with the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Yu v. Northwest Pipeline Corp.
D.Utah, 1991.
United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division.
Dorothy D.S. YU, Plaintiff,
v.
NORTHWEST PIPELINE CORPORATION, a corporation of the State of Delaware, Juanita Reid,
Karen McPheeters, Tom O'Keefe and Howard Finley, Defendants.
Civ. No. 89-C-834W.
June 11, 1991.
Louise T. Knauer, Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff.
Robert A. Peterson, Teresa Silcox, Paul E. Pratt,
Northwest Pipeline Corp., Salt Lake City, Utah, for
defendants.
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hired by Northwest in January 1979 and held the
position of Office Administrator of the Business Information Center at the time of her termination.
On or about May 6, 1988, defendant Karen
McPheeters, Northwest's Corporate Librarian, discovered on or in plaintiffs desk a document from
the Personnel Department listing the degrees, major
fields of study and universities attended by Northwest employees. Plaintiffs duties as Office Administrator did not involve access to any documents generated by the personnel department.
Northwest's Standard Operating Policies and
Procedures Manual ("SOP Manual"), in effect and
posted on a bulletin board at the time of plaintiffs
employment, provided as follows:
Damaging the integrity of, or compromising
the confidentiality of corporate information ... may
be cause for disciplinary action up to an including
discharge.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
WINDER, District Judge.
*1 This matter is before the court on cross motions for summary judgment. A hearing on these
motions was held March 12, 1991. Plaintiff was
represented by Louise T. Knauer. Defendants were
represented by Robert A. Peterson, Teresa Silcox
and Paul E. Pratt. Before the hearing, the court considered carefully the memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since taking the matter
under advisement, the court has further considered
the law and facts relating to these motions. Now being fully advised, the court renders the following
memorandum decision and order.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a non-white, Chinese-born woman,
who was fifty-one years of age when she was terminated by defendant Northwest Pipeline Corporation ("Northwest") on May 16, 1988. Plaintiff was

© 2008 Thomson/West. No

SOP No. 12.3006(3)(m) at 1. The SOP Manual
further provided thatit should not be inferred from
this policy than an employee can only be discharged for committing violations on this list
[including compromising the confidentiality of corporate information], nor should this policy be construed to alter the Company's rights as an employer
at will.
Id.
McPheeters reported to defendant Juanita
Reed, Manager of Employee Development and
Communications, that she had discovered the personnel document in plaintiffs possession. The Personnel Department then notified defendant Tom
O'Keefe, Manger of General Services, of the discovery. Defendant Howard Finley, plaintiffs immediate supervisor, was out of town at the time.
On May 11, 1988, O'Keefe began an investigation of the matter. During the investigation,
plaintiff admitted the personnel document was in
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her possession and that she had obtained the document from Trent Enser, an employee in the Records
Department. Plaintiff said she had placed the document in her desk drawer because it contained an inaccuracy concerning her educational background
that she wanted corrected.

sushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Wright v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir.1991).

Enser admitted to O'Keefe that he had given
the document to plaintiff. O'Keefe determined that
the personnel document was a confidential personnel record, that plaintiff should not have had possession of the document and that both plaintiff and
Enser had violated Northwest's policy regarding
confidential corporate records. On May 16, 1988,
Northwest terminated plaintiff under SOP No.
12.3006(3)(m) for damaging the integrity or compromising the confidentiality of corporate information. Enser also was terminated.
*2 Following plaintiffs termination, Northwest
informed Utah Job Services that plaintiff had been
terminated for breach of confidentiality, and therefore should be denied unemployment compensation. Non-supervisory Northwest employees also
were informed that plaintiff had been terminated for
breach of corporate confidentiality.
During her employment with Northwest,
plaintiff applied for five positions other than the
one she held and was not hired for any of them.
Plaintiff claims that Northwest hired two younger,
white American-born females and three younger,
white American-born males for these positions.

Once the moving party has carried its burden,
Rule 56(e)"requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by ... affidavits, or by the
'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Celotex Corp. v
Catrett, All U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Gonzales v.
Millers Casualty Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1417, 1419
(10th Cir.l991). FN1 The non-moving party must
"make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial." Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S.Ct.
3177, 3186 (1990) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477
U.S. at 322).
In considering whether there exists a genuine
issue of material fact, the court does not weigh the
evidence but instead inquires whether a reasonable
jury, faced with the evidence presented, could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 411 U.S. 242, 249
(1986); Clifton v. Craig, 924 F.2d 182, 183 (10th
Cir.l991). FN2 Finally, all material facts asserted
by the moving party shall be deemed admitted unless specifically controverted by the opposing
party. U.S.Ct.D.Utah Civ.R.P. 5(e).

DISCUSSION
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c).
In applying this standard, the court must construe
all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mat-
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Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint asserts
seven causes of action: (1) discriminatory treatment
on the basis of plaintiffs gender, race and national
origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2000e-17; (2) discriminatory treatment and
discharge on the basis of plaintiffs age in violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); (3) breach of employment contract; (4) breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) defamation
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against defendants Northwest, Reid and O Keefe
(6) defamation against defendant McPheeters and
(7) intentional interference with contractual relations against defendant McPheeters

proving
intentional
discrimination
assuming
plaintiff has established a prima facie case and de
fendant has presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason Howcroft 712 F Supp at 1520

*3 Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all claims Plaintiff has moved for partial
summary judgment as to the liability issues on her
Title VII, ADEA, breach of contract and defamation claims The court considers each claim m turn

Defendant Northwest contends that even assuming plaintiff has established a prima facie case
of discriminatory treatment and discharge, she cannot carry the ultimate burden of proving intentional
discrimination On that ground alone, Northwest ar
gues, it is entitled to summary judgment The court
disagrees With respect to plaintiffs theoiy of dis
criminatory discharge plaintiff has presented evid
ence that a few years prior to plaintiffs teimination
a younger, white, native-born male who violated
company confidentiality policies was not teimin
ated Plaintiff also has presented evidence that she
was equally or better qualified than the persons selected for the other positions for which she applied
and was rejected

A Title VII and ADEA Claims
In McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green 411
U S 792 (1973), the United States Supreme Court
defined the elements and burdens of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case under Title VII
Plaintiff must establish that she was (1) a member
of a protected class, (2) adversely affected by defendant's employment decision, (3) qualified for the
position, and (4) replaced or rejected in favor of a
person not in a protected class McDonnell Douglas
Corp 411 U S at 802
Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,
the burden of production shifts to the employer to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employee's rejection Id After the employer
presents a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the reason offered is
in fact a mere pretext for impermissible discrimination Id at 804
Cases brought under ADEA are subject to the
same requirements ot proof as Title VII cases alleging discriminatory treatment Branson v Price
River Coal Co 853 F 2d 768, 770 (10th Cir 1988)
Employers defending a Title VII or ADEA
claim can establish a basis for summary judgment
two ways First, the defendant can demonstrate that
the plaintiff will be unable to establish a prima
facie case at trial How croft v Mountain States Tel
and Tel Co 712 F Supp 1514, 1520 (D Utah
1989) Alternatively the defendant can demonstrate
that the plaintiff cannot carry the ultimate burden of
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In the court's opinion, this evidence is sufficient to raise a factual question about whether
Northwest's reasons for failing to promote and for
discharging plaintiff were pretextual or legitimate
Accordingly, neither defendant Northwest nor
plaintiff are entitled to summary judgment on the
Title VII and ADEA claims

B Breach of Employment Contract
*4 Plaintiff claims the SOP Manual created an
express or implied contract that plaintiff be terminated only for cause The presumption under Utah
law is that any employment contract that contains
no specified term of duration is terminable at the
will of either party See Berube v Fashion Centei
Ltd 111 P2d 1033 1044 (Utah 1989) This pic
sumption may be rebutted by evidence that certain
terms in an employee policy manual were implied
terms of the contract of employment and limited the
employer's right to discharge Berube 111 P 2d at
1044
Smce this case was argued and submitted, the

lm to Orig U S Govt Works

Lttps7/web2 westlaw com/print/printstream aspx^prft^HTMLE&destination^atp&sv^Spht

2/29/2008

Not Reported in F.Supp.
Not Reported in F.Supp., 1991 WL 355137 (D.Utah), 56
IER Cases 1116
(Cite as: Not Reported in F.Supp.)

Page 4
ir Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 313, 122 Lab.Cas. P 56,993, 6

Utah Supreme Court has elaborated on the Berube
implied employment contract theory in the case of
Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 20590 (Utah May
16, 1991)(1991 Westlaw 80706). In Brehany, the
Utah Supreme Court set forth two propositions that
must be established by employees who claim their
at-will status was altered by language in employment manuals. First, the employee must show that
the provisions in the manual limit or modify the
employer's unfettered right to discharge its employees. Brehany, slip op. at 9. Once this burden is carried, the employee then must demonstrate that the
employer violated the terms of the manual. Id.

C. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing

If the terms of the employment manual do purport to limit the employer's power to discharge, the
question of whether thev become implied terms of
the employment contract is primarily a factual issue. Id. The proper construction of contractual
terms in the first instance, however, is an issue of
law to be decided by the court, unless the contract
terms are ambiguous and raise factual issues. Id.
"Thus, when it is plain that a manual or bulletin
does not limit the right to discharge at will, the case
need not go to a jury." Id.
Applying the law of Berube and Brehany to
this case, the court concludes that the SOP Manual
plainly did not limit Northwest's right to discharge
at will, and thus defendant was free to discharge
plaintiff for any nondiscriminatory reason. The
SOP Manual expressly states that "[i]t should not
be inferred from this policy that an employee can
only be discharged for committing violations on
this list, nor should this policy be construed to alter
the Company's rights as an employer at will" SOP
Manual No. 12.3006(3)(m) at 1 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff has failed to carry her initial burden of
demonstrating that the SOP Manual somehow limited or modified Northwest's right to discharge her.
Northwest therefore is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs breach of employment contract
claim.

Plaintiffs claim that defendant breached a duty
of good faith and fair dealing in discharging her
fails as a matter of law. Without comment, the Utah
Supreme Court refused to recognize such a claim in
Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis of Utah, Inc., Ill
P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989). In Brehany v Nordstrom, Inc, No. 20590 (Utah May 16, 1991), the
court again rejected this legal theory and this time
cleared up any confusion that may have surrounded
the implied covenant of good faith in the employment contract context. Id., slip op. at 7-9.
*5 The Brehany court explained that the purpose and function of the covenant of good faith implied in all contracts differs from the purpose and
function of the so-called covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in employment contracts. The former
covenant presumes that the parties intended the
rights and duties created by the contract to be performed and exercised in good faith. Brehany, slip
op. at 8. The latter covenant, on the other hand, acts
as a substantive limitation on the employer's right
to discharge. Id.
The Brehany court stated that "in the absence
of express terms limiting the right of an employer
to discharge for any or no reason and in the absence
of provisions establishing procedures by which a
discharge should be effectuated, it would be inconsistent to hold that an employer, on the basis of the
implied covenant of good faith, is bound to a substantive limitation on the employer's right to discharge." Id.
Northwest, therefore, is entitled to summary
judgment on plaintiffs claim for breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

D. Defamation
Plaintiff claims that defendants Northwest, Reid and O'Keefe defamed plaintiff by informing Utah
Job Services and various Northwest employees that
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plaintiff was terminated for violating the confidentiality of company records Plaintiff further claims
that defendant McPheeters defamed plaintiff by informing Northwest management that McPheeters
discovered the personnel document on rather than
in plaintiffs desk and by informing Northwest employees that plaintiff was terminated for breaching
the company confidentiality policy

Service, had a corresponding interest in hearing the
information Similarly, McPheeters statements to
co-workers were privileged as statements between
members of a group with a common interest Be
cause there is no evidence that defendants abused
the common interest qualified privilege, the statements by Reid, O'Keefe and McPheeters are not actionable

The alleged defamatory statement communicated by McPheeters to the Northwest managers related solely to the location of the personnel document If, as plaintiff alleges, the location of the document was the only untruth, the court finds as a
matter of law that the statement could not be defamatory Whether the document was on or in the
desk is not determinative Possession, not location,
of the document is the critical fact for purposes of
determining defamatory content, and plaintiff does
not dispute such possession

Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs defamation claims
against them

With respect to McPheeters' statements to
Northwest employees, the court finds that such
communications were truthful or privileged Similarly, the court finds that even if the statements of
defendants Reid and O'Keefe were defamatory per
se, such statements also were truthful or privileged,
and thus are not actionable
A communication between an employer and an
employee is protected by the common interest qualified privilege when (1) the statement refers to a
matter in which the speaker has an interest or duty,
(2) the recipient had a corresponding duty, and (3)
the communication was made pursuant to that duty
Lind v Lynch 665 P 2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1983),
Sowell v ML Freight Inc 30 Utah 2d 446, 519
P 2d 884, 885 (1974), Alford v Utah League of Cities and Towns 791 P 2d 201, 204 (Utah App 1990)
*6 It is undisputed that any allegedly defamatory statements made by Reid or O'Keefe were communicated pursuant to the company investigation of
the circumstances surrounding plaintiffs possession
of the personnel document The recipients of the information, selected Northwest employees and Job

E Intentional Interference with Contractual

Rela

tions

Plaintiffs final claim is that McPheeters in
terfered with her employment relationship with
Northwest by searching plaintiffs desk and informing Northwest that she discovered the personnel
document for the wrongful purpose of having
plaintiff disciplined or terminated
Tortious interference with contractual relations
however, requires three actors two contracting
parties and a third interfering party Leigh Fin
niture and Carpet Co v Isom 657 P 2d 293 301
(Utah 1982) There is no third party when the al
leged interferer is an agent of the employer acting
within the scope of her employment Fletchei v
Wesley Medical Center 585 F Supp 1260, 1262 63
(DKan 1984)
Because the undisputed facts demonstrate that
McPheeters' allegedly interfering acts were within
the scope of her employment, such acts are attributable to Northwest Thus, plaintiffs claim fails as a
matter of law and McPheeters is entitled to summary judgment
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, and good
cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
1 Defendants' motion for summary judgment is
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granted as to all claims except plaintiffs claims
against defendant Northwest under Title VII and
ADEA
2 Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is
denied.
3 This order shall suffice as the court's ruling
on this motion and no further order need be prepared by counsel
FN1 The summary judgment motion may
be "opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except
the mere pleadings themselves" Celotex
Corp v Catrett, 477 U S 317, 324 (1986)
FN2 "The mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence in support of the [nonmoving
party's] position will be insufficient" Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc Ml U S
242,252(1986)
D Utah, 1991
Yu v Northwest Pipeline Corp
Not Reported in F Supp, 1991 WL 355137
(DUtah), 56 Fair Empl Prac Cas (BNA) 313, 122
Lab Cas P 56,993, 6 IER Cases 1116
END OF DOCUMENT
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